{"id":16327,"date":"2020-02-02T10:00:50","date_gmt":"2020-02-04T02:24:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2020\/02\/04\/82119e9d2b\/"},"modified":"2020-02-04T10:25:00","modified_gmt":"2020-02-04T02:25:00","slug":"82119e9d2b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2020\/02\/02\/82119e9d2b\/","title":{"rendered":"\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011 \u7b2c18\u671f | Security Studies Vol.28, No.5, 2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\u300a\u5b89\u5168\u7814\u7a76\u300b\u6536\u5f55\u51fa\u7248\u521b\u65b0\u6027\u7684\u5b66\u672f\u7a3f\u4ef6<\/span>\u2014\u2014\u65e0\u8bba\u662f\u7406\u8bba\u7814\u7a76\u3001\u5b9e\u8df5\u7ecf\u9a8c\u5206\u4eab\u8fd8\u662f\u4e24\u8005\u517c\u800c\u6709\u4e4b\u3002\u5b89\u5168\u7814\u7a76\u5305\u542b\u5e7f\u6cdb\u7684\u8bae\u9898\uff0c\u4ece\u6838\u6269\u6563\u3001\u6838\u5a01\u6151\u3001\u519b\u6c11\u5173\u7cfb\u3001\u6218\u7565\u6587\u5316\u3001\u79cd\u65cf\u51b2\u7a81\u3001\u6d41\u884c\u75c5\u4e0e\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168\u3001\u6c11\u4e3b\u653f\u6cbb\u3001\u5916\u4ea4\u51b3\u7b56\u5230\u5b9a\u6027\u4e0e\u591a\u65b9\u6cd5\u7814\u7a76\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\u3002\u6839\u636e2018<\/span>\u5e74\u7684<\/span>Journal Citation Reports<\/span>\u663e\u793a\uff0c\u5176<\/span>2018<\/span>\u5e74\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u56e0\u5b50\u4e3a<\/span>1.706<\/span>\uff0c\u5728<\/span>91<\/span>\u79cd\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7c7b\u671f\u520a\u4e2d\u6392\u540d\u7b2c<\/span>30<\/span>\uff08<\/span>30\/91<\/span>\uff09\u3002<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/strong>\u674e\u535a\u8f69\u3001\u738b\u56fd\u6b23\u3001\u59da\u5bf0\u5b87<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u5ba1\u6821\u3011<\/strong>\u51af\u6bd3\u5a67\u3001\u5218\u91d1\u6676\u3001\u5f90\u741b<\/span><\/strong><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6392\u7248\u3011\u9ad8\u4f73\u7f8e<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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1.\u77f3\u6cb9\u4ea4\u6613\uff1a<\/span><\/span>\u5927\u56fd\u3001\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u3001\u548c\u77f3\u6cb9\u8054\u76df<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

A Crude Bargain: Great Powers, Oil States, and Petro-Alignment<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

2.\u4e0d\u8c08\u662f\u5426\uff0c\u4f46\u95ee\u4f55\u65f6\uff1f<\/span><\/span>\u6218\u4e89\u4e2d\u653f\u5e9c\u5bf9\u6c11\u5175\u7684\u4f7f\u7528<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Not Whether, But When? Governments\u2019 Use of Militias in War<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

3. \u7f51\u7edc\u5f0f\u5408\u4f5c\uff1a<\/span><\/span>\u6b27\u76df\u5982\u4f55\u52a8\u5458\u7ef4\u548c\u90e8\u961f\u5411\u6d77\u5916\u90e8\u7f72\u529b\u91cf\uff1f<\/span><\/span><\/strong> <\/p>\n

Networked Cooperation: How the European Union Mobilizes Peacekeeping Forces to Project Power Abroad<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

4. \u5fe0\u8bda\u5ea6\u7684\u5e73\u8861\uff1a<\/span><\/span>\u89e3\u91ca\u5c3c\u52a0\u62c9\u74dc\u9769\u547d\u4e2d\u7684\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6d3e\u7cfb\u6597\u4e89<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Balance of Loyalties: Explaining Rebel Factional Struggles in the Nicaraguan Revolution<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

5. \u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u4e1c\u6b63\u6559\u4e0e\u6838\u6307\u6325\u53ca\u63a7\u5236\uff1a<\/span><\/span>\u4e00\u4e2a\u5047\u8bbe<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian Orthodox Church and Nuclear Command and Control: A Hypothesis<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

6. \u518d\u8bba\u75af\u5b50\u7406\u8bba\uff1a<\/span><\/span>\u5bf9\u5f3a\u5236\u6027\u4ea4\u6d89\u4e2d\u4e0d\u540c\u5f62\u5f0f\u53ef\u611f\u77e5\u75af\u72c2\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\u8bc4\u4f30<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Percei<\/span>ved Madness in Coercive Bargaining<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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1.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee<\/strong>\u3011<\/span><\/span>A Crude Bargain: Great Powers, Oil States, and Petro-Alignment<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005<\/strong>\u3011<\/span><\/span>Inwook Kim\uff0c<\/span>\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u7ba1\u7406\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u5b66\u526f\u6559\u6388\u3002<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u3010\u6458\u8981<\/strong>\u3011\u77f3\u6cb9\u8054\u76df\uff0c\u6307\u5927\u56fd\u63d0\u4f9b\u5b89\u5168\u4ee5\u6362\u53d6\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u77f3\u6cb9\u4f18\u60e0\u653f\u7b56\u7684\u4e00\u79cd\u4ea4\u6613\u5b89\u6392\uff0c\u662f\u4e00\u79cd\u867d\u7136\u88ab\u5e7f\u6cdb\u4f7f\u7528\u4f46\u5c1a\u672a\u88ab\u7406\u8bba\u5316\u7684\u80fd\u6e90\u5b89\u5168\u6218\u7565\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u4ea4\u6613\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u5c42\u9762\u662f\u5927\u56fd\u9009\u62e9\u4e0d\u540c\u5c42\u6b21\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u627f\u8bfa\u6765\u83b7\u5f97\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u7684\u653f\u7b56\u4f18\u60e0\u3002\u5927\u56fd\u6839\u636e\u4ec0\u4e48\u6807\u51c6\u6765\u5bf9\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u7684\u91cd\u8981\u7a0b\u5ea6\u8fdb\u884c\u6392\u5e8f\u5462\uff1f\u6211\u4eec\u5982\u4f55\u5bf9\u4e0d\u540c\u7c7b\u578b\u7684\u77f3\u6cb9\u8054\u76df\u8fdb\u884c\u6982\u5ff5\u5316\uff1f\u5728\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u77f3\u6cb9\u8054\u76df\u7c7b\u578b\u4e0b\u5927\u56fd\u548c\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u5404\u81ea\u5230\u5e95\u60f3\u8981\u4ea4\u6613\u4ec0\u4e48\uff1f\u672c\u6587\u8ba4\u4e3a\u5e02\u573a\u6743\u529b\u548c\u5730\u7f18\u6218\u7565\u4f4d\u7f6e\u5171\u540c\u51b3\u5b9a\u4e86\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u6218\u7565\u4ef7\u503c\u548c\u8106\u5f31\u6027\uff0c\u8fdb\u800c\u4ea7\u751f\u56db\u79cd\u5bf9\u5e94\u7684\u77f3\u6cb9\u8054\u76df\u7c7b\u578b<\/span>\u2014\u2014\u5b89\u5168\u4fdd\u969c\u578b\u3001\u6218\u7565\u8054\u76df\u578b\u3001\u6218\u7565\u4f18\u52bf\u578b\u548c\u6218\u7565\u5ffd\u89c6\u578b\u3002\u4e3a\u4e86\u5c55\u793a\u5927\u56fd\u5982\u4f55\u57fa\u4e8e\u77f3\u6cb9\u5e02\u573a\u548c\u4e0d\u540c\u5730\u7f18\u6218\u7565\u5730\u4f4d\u7684\u72ec\u5230\u903b\u8f91\u6765\u5efa\u7acb\u3001\u5229\u7528\u4ee5\u53ca\u7ef4\u6301\u77f3\u6cb9\u8054\u76df\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u7cbe\u5fc3\u6311\u9009\u4e24\u4e2a\u6848\u4f8b\u8fdb\u884c\u5bf9\u6bd4\uff1a<\/span>1970-1991\u5e74\u7684\u6c99\u7279\u548c\u79d1\u5a01\u7279\u3001<\/span>1990-2013\u5e74\u7684\u963f\u585e\u62dc\u7586\u548c\u5384\u74dc\u591a\u5c14\u3002\u672c\u6587\u7684\u53d1\u73b0\u5bf9\u5927\u56fd\u7684\u5927\u6218\u7565\u3001\u4ea7\u6cb9\u56fd\u7684\u6218\u7565\u884c\u4e3a\u548c\u77f3\u6cb9\u5728\u56fd\u9645\u5b89\u5168\u4e2d\u7684\u89d2\u8272\u4e09\u4e2a\u65b9\u9762\u5177\u6709\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u6307\u5bfc\u610f\u4e49\u3002<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for oil states\u2019 friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet under theorized energy security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How dowe conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do greatpowers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit thata mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic valueand vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment<\/span>–<\/span>security guarantee, strategic alignment, <\/span>strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons\u2014Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970\u201391, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990\u20132013\u2014show howgreat powers creat<\/span>ed, utilized, and maintained petro-<\/span>alignments under theunique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. Thefindings have important implications on great powers\u2019 grand strate<\/span>gies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international security.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010<\/span>\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u738b\u56fd\u6b23<\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u4e0d\u8c08\u662f\u5426\uff0c\u4f46\u95ee\u4f55\u65f6\uff1f<\/span><\/strong><\/strong><\/span><\/strong><\/strong>\u6218\u4e89\u4e2d\u653f\u5e9c\u5bf9\u6c11\u5175\u7684\u4f7f\u7528<\/span><\/strong><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee<\/span><\/strong>\u3011<\/span>Not Whether, But When? Governments\u2019 Use of Militias in War<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>\u3010\u4f5c\u8005<\/strong>\u3011<\/span>Caitlin Ambrozik<\/span>\uff0c\u4e54\u6cbb\u00b7\u534e\u76db\u987f\u5927\u5b66\u827e\u7565\u7279\u56fd\u9645\u4e8b\u52a1\u5b66\u9662\u517c\u804c\u6559\u6388\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span>Although government use of militias during civil conflict can ultimately undermine stateauthority, governments still use militias for battle field assistance. This paper examines the selectivity of government decisions to use militias by disaggregating civil conflict to the level of battle phases. Civil-conflict battles typically consist of four phases: preparation, clear, hold, and build. I argue that governments decide to use militias based on the strength of government security forces, operational advantages of militias, and the type of battlephase. Governments will limit the use of militias during key battle phases thatare likely to receive increased media attention unless a victory secured by government security forces is unlikely or militias hold an operational advantage. A comparative analysis of the offensive operations in Tikrit and Ramadi during Iraq\u2019s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lends initial support to this theory.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u738b\u56fd\u6b23<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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3.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u7f51\u7edc\u5f0f\u5408\u4f5c\uff1a<\/span>\u6b27\u76df\u5982\u4f55\u52a8\u5458\u7ef4\u548c\u90e8\u961f\u5411\u6d77\u5916\u90e8\u7f72\u529b\u91cf\uff1f<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee<\/span><\/strong>\u3011<\/span><\/strong><\/span>Networked Cooperation: How the EuropeanUnion Mobilizes Peacekeeping Forces to Project Power Abroad<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005<\/strong>\u3011<\/span>Marina E. Henke, <\/span>\u5fb7\u56fd\u8d6b\u5c14\u8482\u884c\u653f\u5b66\u9662\u548c\u7f8e\u56fd\u897f\u5317\u5927\u5b66\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u6559\u6388\uff0c\u7814\u7a76\u91cd\u70b9\u4e3a\u519b\u4e8b\u5e72\u9884\uff0c\u7ef4\u548c\u884c\u52a8\u4ee5\u53ca\u6b27\u6d32\u5b89\u5168\u4e0e\u9632\u536b\u653f\u7b56\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u3010\u6458\u8981<\/strong>\u3011<\/span>\u6b27\u76df\u5982\u4f55\u62db\u52df\u5728\u6b27\u76df\u7ef4\u548c\u7279\u6d3e\u56e2\u4e2d\u670d\u52a1\u7684\u90e8\u961f\u548c\u8b66\u5bdf\uff1f<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u8ba4\u4e3a\uff0c\u5173\u952e\u7684\u6b27\u76df\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u548c\u6b27\u76df\u5b98\u5458\u6218\u7565\u6027\u5730\u5229\u7528\u5176\u6240\u5904\u7684\u793e\u4f1a\u548c\u5236\u5ea6\u7f51\u7edc\uff0c\u5d4c\u5165\u5176\u4e2d\u5e76\u529d\u8bf4\u4e0d\u60c5\u613f\u7684\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u63d0\u4f9b\u8fd9\u4e9b\u529b\u91cf\u3002<\/span>\u8fd9\u4e9b\u7f51\u7edc\u63d0\u4f9b\u6709\u5173\u90e8\u7f72\u504f\u597d\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u4fc3\u8fdb\u65c1\u652f\u4ed8\u548c\u95ee\u9898\u5173\u8054\uff0c\u5e76\u63d0\u4f9b\u53ef\u9760\u7684\u627f\u8bfa\u3002<\/span>\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u6b63\u5982\u73b0\u6709\u6587\u732e\u4e2d\u7ecf\u5e38\u63d0\u5230\u7684\uff0c\u6b27\u76df\u7684\u8fd0\u4f5c\u4e0d\u4e00\u5b9a\u4f9d\u8d56\u4e8e\u6b27\u76df\u5185\u90e8\u7684\u504f\u597d\u8d8b\u540c\u3002<\/span>\u76f8\u53cd\uff0c\u6b27\u76df\u7ef4\u548c\u90e8\u961f\u7684\u62db\u52df\u4f9d\u8d56\u6b27\u76df\u5185\u9ad8\u5ea6\u79ef\u6781\u4e3b\u52a8\u7684\u884c\u4e3a\u4f53\uff0c\u800c\u5b83\u4eec\u5229\u7528\u793e\u4f1a\u548c\u5236\u5ea6\u8054\u7cfb\u6765\u8bf4\u670d\u5176\u4ed6\u56fd\u5bb6\u52a0\u5165\u6b27\u76df\u7ef4\u548c\u7279\u6d3e\u56e2\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span>How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peace<\/span>ke<\/span>eping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use o<\/span>f the socialand institutional networks within which they are embedded to <\/span>bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide<\/span> for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessa<\/span>r<\/span>ily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence<\/span>\u2014<\/span>as is often suggested <\/span>in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional<\/span> ties to negotiate fellow states into serving <\/span>in an EU missions.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010<\/span>\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u674e\u535a\u8f69<\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011\u5218\u91d1\u6676\u3001<\/span><\/strong>\u5f90\u741b<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n


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4.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u5fe0\u8bda\u5ea6\u7684\u5e73\u8861\uff1a<\/span><\/span>\u89e3\u91ca\u5c3c\u52a0\u62c9\u74dc\u9769\u547d\u4e2d\u7684\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6d3e\u7cfb\u6597\u4e89<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong><\/span>Balance of Loyalties: Explaining RebelFactional Struggles in the Nicaraguan Revolution<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong><\/span>Eric S. Mosinger, <\/span>\u52a0\u62ff\u5927\u5361\u5c14\u987f\u5927\u5b66\u5c0f\u7f57\u4f2f\u7279\u00b7\u5965\u767b<\/span>(Robert A. Oden Jr.)<\/span>\u535a\u58eb\u540e\u7814\u7a76\u5458\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span>\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5982\u4f55\u89e3\u91ca\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6d3e\u7cfb\u6597\u4e89\u7684\u539f\u56e0\u548c\u7ed3\u679c\uff1f\u73b0\u6709\u7684\u89e3\u91ca\u96c6\u4e2d\u5728\u5916\u90e8\u56e0\u7d20\u548c\u7269\u8d28\u56e0\u7d20\u5bf9\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u5185\u90e8\u7684\u7834\u574f\u3002\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u5373\u4f7f\u5728\u6ca1\u6709\u5916\u90e8\u51b2\u51fb\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\u4e0b\uff0c\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u4e5f\u4f1a\u53d7\u56f0\u4e8e\u5185\u6597\u548c\u7ec4\u7ec7\u5206\u88c2\u3002\u672c\u6587\u63d0\u51fa\u4e86\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6d3e\u7cfb\u6597\u4e89\u7684\u5185\u751f\u6027\u548c\u793e\u4f1a\u6027\u7406\u8bba\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u9886\u5bfc\u6743\u7ea0\u7eb7\u662f\u7531\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u5185\u90e8\u5fe0\u8bda\u5ea6\u5e73\u8861\u7684\u53d8\u5316\u5f15\u8d77\u7684\u3002\u5728\u672c\u6587\u7684\u6a21\u578b\u4e2d\uff0c\u654c\u5bf9\u7684\u53db\u4e71\u7ec4\u7ec7\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u901a\u8fc7\u4e24\u79cd\u7f51\u7edc\u57f9\u517b\u5fe0\u8bda\u5ea6\uff0c\u5373\u62db\u52df\u7f51\u7edc\u548c\u8fd0\u8425\u7f51\u7edc\uff0c\u5b83\u4eec\u662f\u53d1\u8d77\u9886\u5bfc\u6743\u4e89\u593a\uff0c\u53d1\u52a8\u653f\u53d8\u6216\u5206\u88c2\u7ec4\u7ec7\u7684\u52a8\u529b\u57fa\u7840\u3002\u672c\u6587\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u57fa\u4e8e\u5bf9\u5c3c\u52a0\u62c9\u74dc\u7684\u6851\u5730\u8bfa\u6c11\u65cf\u89e3\u653e\u9635\u7ebf\uff08<\/span>FSLN<\/span>\uff09\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\u7814\u7a76\uff0c\u800c\u8be5\u7ec4\u7ec7\u5728<\/span>1975-1976<\/span>\u5e74\u95f4\u5206\u88c2\u4e3a\u4e09\u4e2a\u6d3e\u7cfb\u3002\u5229\u7528\u6709\u5173<\/span>FSLN<\/span>\u6307\u6325\u5b98\u7684\u539f\u59cb\u7f51\u7edc\u6570\u636e\u96c6\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u8ffd\u8e2a\u4e86\u8be5\u7ec4\u7ec7\u7684\u7f51\u7edc\u7ed3\u6784\u968f\u65f6\u95f4\u7684\u53d8\u5316\u60c5\u51b5\uff0c\u5e76\u8ba4\u4e3a\u56f4\u7ed5\u666e\u901a\u6b66\u88c5\u4eba\u5458\u5fe0\u8bda\u7684\u4e89\u593a\u662f<\/span>FSLN<\/span>\u5206\u88c2\u539f\u56e0\u6240\u5728\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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What explains the causes and outcomes ofrebel factional struggles? Existing explanations focus on exogenous andmaterial factors that disrupt rebel organizations\u2019<\/span> internalprocesses. Yet rebel groups succumb to infighting and organizational splinterseven in the absence of external shocks. In this article I present an endogenousand social theory of rebel factional struggles, in which leadership disputesresult from a shifting balance of loyalties within a rebel organization. In mymodel, rival rebel leaders cultivate the loyalty of two types of networks,recruitment networks and operational networks, which serve as power bases toinitiate leadership struggles, launch coups, or split organizations. I build mytheory through a case study of Nicaragua\u2019s Frente Sandinista de Liberac<\/span>i\u00f3n<\/span> Nacional (FSLN), which splintered into three factions in 1975\u2013<\/span>76. Drawing on an original network dataset of FSLN commanders, Itrace how the organization\u2019s network structure changed over time, spurringdisputes over rank-and-file fighters\u2019<\/span>loyaltiesthat tore the FSLN apart.<\/span><\/p>\n

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 <\/span>\u3010<\/span>\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u674e\u535a\u8f69<\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u4e1c\u6b63\u6559\u4e0e\u6838\u6307\u6325\u53ca\u63a7\u5236\uff1a\u4e00\u4e2a\u5047\u8bbe<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Russian Orthodox Church and Nuclear Command and Control: A Hypothesis<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky<\/span>\uff0c\u4ee5\u8272\u5217\u8d6b\u5179\u5229\u4e9a\u8de8\u5b66\u79d1\u7814\u7a76\u4e2d\u5fc3\uff08<\/span>IDC Herzliya\uff09\u526f\u6559\u6388\u3002<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span>\u3010\u6458\u8981<\/span><\/strong>\u3011<\/span>\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u4e1c\u6b63\u6559\u5728\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u5f53\u524d\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168\u653f\u7b56\u4e2d\u626e\u6f14\u4e86\u91cd\u8981\u89d2\u8272\u3002\u6559\u4f1a\u548c\u6218\u7565\u7fa4\u4f53\u7684\u4ea4\u7ec7\u5728\u6838\u6b66\u5668\u7efc\u5408\u8bbe\u65bd\u4e2d\u4f53\u73b0\u6700\u4e3a\u660e\u663e\u2014\u2014\u795e\u804c\u4eba\u5458\u5df2\u7ecf\u6e17\u900f\u5230\u5404\u7ea7\u90e8\u961f\u5e76\u53c2\u4e0e\u4f5c\u6218\u6d3b\u52a8\uff0c\u5e76\u89c6\u81ea\u5df1\u4e3a\u56fd\u5bb6\u6838\u6f5c\u529b\u610f\u4e49\u7684\u63d0\u4f9b\u8005\u548c\u6838\u6f5c\u529b\u7684\u5b88\u62a4\u8005\u3002\u672c\u6587\u9996\u5148\u5f3a\u8c03\u4e86\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u6559\u4f1a\u4e0e\u6838\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u5e76\u91cd\u70b9\u8ba8\u8bba\u4e86\u6559\u4f1a\u5bf9\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u6838\u6307\u6325\u4e0e\u63a7\u5236\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u3002\u7814\u7a76\u7ed3\u679c\u8868\u660e\uff0c\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u7684\u519b\u4e8b\u795e\u804c\u4eba\u5458\uff08\u4e0e\u82cf\u8054\u7684\u653f\u5ba2\u4e00\u6837\u4f46\u4e0d\u540c\u4e8e\u5176\u4ed6\u56fd\u5bb6\u7684\u795e\u804c\u4eba\u5458\uff09\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u6210\u4e3a\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u672a\u6765\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168\u51b3\u7b56\u7684\u53c2\u4e0e\u8005\uff1b\u4e8b\u5b9e\u4e0a\uff0c\u4fc4\u7f57\u65af\u53ef\u80fd\u51fa\u73b0\u4e24\u6761\u5e73\u884c\u7684\u6307\u6325\u6743\u529b\u7cfb\u7edf\u4e14\u4e8c\u8005\u4e4b\u95f4\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u5b58\u5728\u7d27\u5f20\u5173\u7cfb\u3002\u672c\u6587\u4ecb\u7ecd\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e00\u72ec\u7279\u73b0\u8c61\u88ab\u5ffd\u89c6\u7684\u539f\u56e0\u53ca\u5176\u5bf9\u56fd\u9645\u5b89\u5168\u7406\u8bba\u548c\u5b9e\u8df5\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u3002<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span>The Russian Orthodox Church plays an immense role in current Russian national security policy. The intertwining ofthe church and the strategic community is nowhere more visible than in the nuclear-weapons complex, where the priesthood has penetrated all levels of command, been involved in operational activities, and positioned itself as <\/span>a provider of meanings for<\/span>, and guardian of, the state\u2019s nuclear potential. The first work to highlight the phenomenon of the Russian church-nuclear nexus, this article focuses on the ecclesiastical impact on Russian nuclear command and control. The findings suggest that it is not inconceivable that the Russian military clergy\u2014<\/span>like the Soviet political officers and contrary to chaplains worldwide\u2014<\/span>might become future participants in decision making on matters of national security, and that de facto there might be two parallel chains of command authority emerging in Russia, with potential tensions between them. The article outlines the causes of this overlooked singularity and its implications for the theory and practice of<\/span> international security.<\/span><\/p>\n

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 <\/span>\u3010<\/span>\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u59da\u5bf0\u5b87<\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011\u5218\u91d1\u6676\u3001\u5f90\u741b<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n


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\u518d\u8bba\u75af\u5b50\u7406\u8bba\uff1a<\/strong>\u5bf9\u5f3a\u5236\u6027\u4ea4\u6d89\u4e2d\u4e0d\u540c\u5f62\u5f0f\u53ef\u611f\u77e5\u75af\u72c2\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\u8bc4\u4f30<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong><\/span>Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms ofPerceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Roseanne W. McManus<\/span>\uff0c\u5bbe\u5915\u6cd5\u5c3c\u4e9a\u5dde\u7acb\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u79d1\u5b66\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u4e8b\u52a1\u7cfb\u526f\u6559\u6388\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span>\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u672c\u6587\u91cd\u65b0\u5ba1\u89c6\u4e86\u201c\u75af\u5b50\u7406\u8bba\u201d\u80cc\u540e\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u903b\u8f91\u2014\u2014\u8be5\u89c2\u70b9\u8ba4\u4e3a\u5728\u5f3a\u5236\u6027\u4ea4\u6d89\u4e2d\uff0c\u88ab\u89c6\u4e3a\u75af\u72c2\u7684\u4eba\u80fd\u83b7\u5f97\u4e00\u5b9a\u7684\u4f18\u52bf\u3002\u4f5c\u8005\u5efa\u7acb\u4e86\u4e00\u4e2a\u7406\u8bba\uff0c\u7528\u4e00\u79cd\u4e0e\u5206\u6790\u5f3a\u5236\u6027\u4ea4\u6d89\u76f8\u5173\u7684\u65b9\u5f0f\u5c06\u53ef\u88ab\u611f\u77e5\u7684\u75af\u72c2\u8fdb\u884c\u5b9a\u4e49\u3002\u4f5c\u8005\u533a\u5206\u4e86\u56db\u79cd\u53ef\u611f\u77e5\u7684\u75af\u72c2\u5e76\u4ece\u4e24\u4e2a\u7ef4\u5ea6\u5bf9\u4ed6\u4eec\u8fdb\u884c\u5206\u89e3\u3002\u7b2c\u4e00\u4e2a\u7ef4\u5ea6\u662f\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u662f\u5426\u88ab\u611f\u77e5\u5230\uff08<\/span>a\uff09\u8fdb\u884c\u7406\u6027\u8ba1\u7b97\u4f46\u503e\u5411\u4e8e\u9009\u62e9\u6781\u7aef\u7ed3\u679c\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\uff08<\/span>b\uff09\u5728\u5b9e\u9645\u4e0a\u5df2\u7ecf\u504f\u79bb\u4e86\u9009\u62e9\u8fdb\u884c\u57fa\u4e8e\u7406\u6027\u7ed3\u679c\u7684\u51b3\u7b56\u3002\u7b2c\u4e8c\u4e2a\u7ef4\u5ea6\u662f\u9886\u5bfc\u4eba\u7684\u75af\u72c2\u662f\u5426\u88ab\u611f\u77e5\u5230\u662f\uff08<\/span>a\uff09\u53d7\u73af\u5883\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\uff08<\/span>b\uff09\u53d7\u5176\u4e2a\u4eba\u6027\u60c5\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\u3002\u4f5c\u8005\u8ba4\u4e3a\u6700\u6709\u5229\u4e8e\u8fdb\u884c\u5f3a\u5236\u6027\u4ea4\u6d89\u7684\u75af\u72c2\u7c7b\u578b\u662f\u53d7\u73af\u5883\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\u6781\u7aef\u504f\u597d\u9009\u62e9\u3002\u4f5c\u8005\u4ee5\u963f\u9053\u592b\u00b7\u5e0c\u7279\u52d2\u3001\u5c3c\u57fa\u5854\u00b7\u8d6b\u9c81\u6653\u592b\u3001\u8428\u8fbe\u59c6\u00b7\u4faf\u8d5b\u56e0\u548c\u7a46\u963f\u8fc8\u5c14\u00b7\u5361\u624e\u83f2\u56db\u4e2a\u6848\u4f8b\u5bf9\u5176\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u7814\u7a76\u548c\u9610\u8ff0\u3002<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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<\/span><\/span>This article reconsiders the theoretical logic behind the <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Madman Theory<\/span>\u201d\u2014<\/span>the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I theorize about how we can best define perceived madness in a way that is relevant for analyzing coercive bargaining. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculations, but based on extreme preferences, or (b) actually deviate from rational consequence-based decision making. The second dimension is whether a leader\u2019s madness is perceived to be (a) situational or (b)  dispositional. I argue that situational extreme preferences constitute the type of perceived madness that is most helpful in coercive bargaining. I illustrate my argument using case studies of Adolf Hitler, Nikita Khrushchev, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gaddafi.<\/span><\/p>\n

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