{"id":15456,"date":"2020-01-12T14:01:50","date_gmt":"2020-01-12T15:03:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2020\/01\/12\/1baad2654e\/"},"modified":"2020-01-12T23:07:47","modified_gmt":"2020-01-12T15:07:47","slug":"1baad2654e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2020\/01\/12\/1baad2654e\/","title":{"rendered":"\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c16\u671f | International Studies Quarterly, No.4, 2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\u300a\u56fd\u9645\u7814\u7a76\u5b63\u520a\u300b\uff08International Studies Quarterly\uff09\u662f\u56fd\u9645\u7814\u7a76\u534f\u4f1a\u7684\u65d7\u8230\u671f\u520a\uff0c\u7531\u725b\u6d25\u5927\u5b66\u51fa\u7248\u793e\u6bcf\u5e74\u53d1\u884c\u56db\u671f\uff0c\u65e8\u5728\u53d1\u8868\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u7814\u7a76\u4e2d\u91cd\u8981\u7406\u8bba\u6027\u3001\u5b9e\u8bc1\u6027\u3001\u89c4\u8303\u6027\u4e3b\u9898\u76f8\u5173\u7684\u9886\u5148\u5b66\u672f\u6210\u679c\u3002<\/span>\u6839\u636eJournal Citation Reports\u7684\u6570\u636e\uff0c2018\u5e74\u8be5\u671f\u520a\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u56e0\u5b50\u4e3a2.172\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u672c\u671f\u76ee\u5f55<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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1. Sectors, Pollution, and Trade: How Industrial Interests Shape Domestic Positions on Global Climate Agreements<\/p>\n

\u884c\u4e1a\u3001\u6c61\u67d3\u548c\u8d38\u6613\uff1a<\/strong><\/span>\u884c\u4e1a\u5229\u76ca\u5982\u4f55\u5851\u9020\u4e00\u56fd\u5728\u5168\u7403\u6027\u6c14\u5019\u534f\u8bae\u4e0a\u7684\u56fd\u5185\u7acb\u573a<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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2. Make Love, Not War: Do Single Young Men Cause Political Violence?<\/p>\n

\u53ea\u505a\u7231\uff0c\u4e0d\u4f5c\u6218\uff1a<\/strong><\/span>\u5355\u8eab\u9752\u5e74\u771f\u7684\u4f1a\u5bfc\u81f4\u653f\u6cbb\u66b4\u529b\u5417\uff1f<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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3. Monetary Power Reconsidered: The Struggle between the Bundesbank and the Fed over Monetary Leadership<\/p>\n

\u91cd\u601d\u8d27\u5e01\u6743\u529b\uff1a<\/span><\/strong>\u5fb7\u610f\u5fd7\u8054\u90a6\u94f6\u884c\u4e0e\u7f8e\u8054\u50a8\u5bf9\u8d27\u5e01\u9886\u5bfc\u6743\u7684\u4e89\u593a<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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4. Legitimacy and the Cognitive of International Institutional Change: The Case of Regional Paliamentarization<\/p>\n

\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5:\u4ee5\u533a\u57df\u8bae\u4f1a\u5316\u4e3a\u4f8b<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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5. The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption<\/p>\n

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6. The Cause and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiation<\/p>\n

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1.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Sectors, Pollution, and Trade: How Industrial Interests Shape Domestic Positions on Global Climate Agreements<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Federica Genovese\uff0c\u82f1\u56fd\u57c3\u585e\u514b\u65af\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u5e9c\u7ba1\u7406\u7cfb\u9ad8\u7ea7\u8bb2\u5e08<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u4eba\u4eec\u901a\u5e38\u8ba4\u4e3a\uff0c\u51cf\u8f7b\u6c61\u67d3\u6240\u8017\u6210\u672c\u662f\u4e00\u56fd\u56fd\u5185\u662f\u5426\u652f\u6301\u56fd\u9645\u6c14\u5019\u5408\u4f5c\u7684\u4e3b\u8981\u969c\u788d\u3002<\/span>\u7279\u522b\u662f\uff0c\u4e00\u4e9b\u5b66\u8005\u66fe\u4e3b\u5f20\uff0c\u56e0\u4e3a\u9700\u8981\u627f\u53d7\u51cf\u8f7b\u6c61\u67d3\u7684\u8d1f\u62c5\uff0c\u4f01\u4e1a\u5f80\u5f80\u4f1a\u7275\u5236\u653f\u5e9c\uff0c\u4f7f\u4e4b\u5728\u5168\u7403\u6027\u6c14\u5019\u534f\u8bae\u4e0a\u6301\u6d88\u6781\u7acb\u573a\u3002<\/span>\u4f46\u7b14\u8005\u8ba4\u4e3a\u4e0a\u8ff0\u89c2\u70b9\u5c1a\u9700\u659f\u914c\uff1a<\/span>\u6c61\u67d3\u6cbb\u7406\u7684\u6210\u672c\u56e0\u7d20\u6781\u5c11\u4f1a\u5bf9\u56fd\u5bb6\u5728\u5168\u7403\u6c14\u5019\u534f\u5b9a\u4e0a\u7684\u504f\u597d\u9020\u6210\u7edd\u5bf9\u5f71\u54cd\u3002<\/span>\u76f8\u53cd\uff0c\u5982\u679c\u53d7\u8d38\u6613\u98ce\u9669\u66b4\u9732\u5f71\u54cd\uff0c\u67d0\u4e2a\u884c\u4e1a\u7684\u6c61\u67d3\u6c34\u5e73\u66f4\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u5f71\u54cd\u4e00\u56fd\u5728\u6c14\u5019\u95ee\u9898\u4e0a\u7684\u5408\u4f5c\u504f\u597d\u3002<\/span>\u8d38\u6613\u5bfc\u5411\u578b\u516c\u53f8\u53ef\u80fd\u65e0\u6cd5\u5177\u5907\u6c14\u5019\u7ba1\u63a7\u7684\u80fd\u529b\uff0c\u56e0\u6b64\u5982\u679c\u6c61\u67d3\u4e25\u91cd\uff0c\u5b83\u4eec\u5bf9\u56fd\u5bb6\u95f4\u7684\u6c14\u5019\u5408\u4f5c\u7406\u5e94\u66f4\u52a0\u654f\u611f\u3002<\/span>\u5982\u679c\u6c61\u67d3\u8f83\u8f7b\uff0c\u8d38\u6613\u5bfc\u5411\u578b\u516c\u53f8\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u652f\u6301\u6c14\u5019\u5408\u4f5c\uff0c\u56e0\u4e3a\u5728\u6548\u7387\u63d0\u9ad8\u7684\u524d\u63d0\u4e0b\uff0c\u516c\u53f8\u66f4\u80fd\u9002\u5e94\u6c14\u5019\u76d1\u7ba1\u7684\u8d1f\u62c5\u3002<\/span>\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u76f8\u4e92\u4f5c\u7528\u800c\u540e\u4fbf\u4f1a\u5f71\u54cd\u653f\u5e9c\u5728\u5168\u7403\u6c14\u5019\u653f\u6cbb\u4e2d\u7684\u7acb\u573a\u3002<\/span>\u5229\u7528\u6765\u81ea\u8054\u5408\u56fd\u6c14\u5019\u8c08\u5224\u4e2d\u5546\u52a1\u62a5\u544a\u548c\u56fd\u5bb6\u4fe1\u606f\u7684\u539f\u59cb\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u7b14\u8005\u5bf9\u5176\u63d0\u51fa\u7684\u8fd9\u4e00\u9488\u5bf9\u7279\u5b9a\u884c\u4e1a\u7684\u89c2\u70b9\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u68c0\u9a8c\u3002<\/span>\u7b14\u8005\u53d1\u73b0\uff0c\u968f\u7740\u8d38\u6613\u5f00\u653e\u884c\u4e1a\u4e2d\u6c61\u67d3\u6392\u653e\u91cf\u7684\u589e\u52a0\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u884c\u4e1a\u4e2d\u7684\u4f01\u4e1a\u66f4\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u53cd\u5bf9\u6c14\u5019\u534f\u5b9a\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e0e\u5176\u89c2\u70b9\u76f8\u7b26\u3002<\/span>\u53e6\u5916\u7b14\u8005\u8fd8\u53d1\u73b0\uff0c\u5728\u9ad8\u6392\u653e\u884c\u4e1a\u5b9e\u884c\u8d38\u6613\u5f00\u653e\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\uff0c\u653f\u5e9c\u5bf9\u4e8e\u6c14\u5019\u5408\u4f5c\u7684\u610f\u613f\u8f83\u4f4e\u3002<\/span>\u8fd9\u4e00\u53d1\u73b0\u5bf9\u4e8e\u7814\u7a76\u73af\u4fdd\u534f\u5b9a\u4e2d\u7684\u56fd\u5185\u653f\u6cbb\u56e0\u7d20\u548c\u5168\u7403\u516c\u5171\u7269\u54c1\u4f9b\u5e94\u4e2d\u7684\u5206\u914d\u5177\u6709\u542f\u793a\u610f\u4e49\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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It is usually assumed that the cost of abating pollution is the main deterrent of domestic support for international climate cooperation. In particular, it is argued that, due to the burden of pollution abatement, businesses commonly constrain governments, which then take less cooperative positions on global climate agreements. I suggest that this argument needs further qualification: pollution-related costs rarely have unconditional effects on preferences for global climate agreements. Instead, a sector\u2019s pollution level is more likely to influence preferences for climate cooperation if mediated by its trade exposure. If pollution is high, firms in high-trade sectors may be less able to absorb climate regulation, and hence they should be more sensitive to climate cooperation. If pollution is low, firms in high-trade sectors may support climate cooperation, because by being more efficient they are more capable of adjusting to regulation. These dynamics should then affect governmental positions on global climate politics. I test my sectoral argument with original data from business statements and national communications at the United Nations climate negotiations. In line with my argument, I find that businesses in trade open sectors are more likely to oppose climate agreement as their sector\u2019s emissions increase. I also find that in countries where high-emission sectors are open to trade governments have low preferences for climate cooperation. The findings have implications for the domestic politics of environmental agreements and the distributive politics of global public good provision.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u623f\u5b87\u99a8<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5218\u745b\u741b<\/span><\/p>\n


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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Make Love, Not War: Do Single Young Men Cause Political Violence?<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Tyler Kustra\uff0c\u5a01\u745f\u6d77\u5fb7\u56fd\u9645\u4e2d\u5fc3\u4e0e\u54c8\u4f5b\u5927\u5b66\u793e\u4f1a\u79d1\u5b66\u5b9a\u91cf\u7814\u7a76\u6240\u8bbf\u95ee\u5b66\u8005<\/span><\/p>\n

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This article calls into question the theory that being single drives young men to commit political violence. It finds that, while the proportion of young men in a country has a statistically significant impact on the level of political violence in the country, whether or not these men are married has no additional impact. The result may appear to contradict the individual-level evidence that shows that young, unmarried men commit the overwhelming majority of political violence. Rebels and terrorists, however, make up only a small part of a country\u2019s population. If participating in political violence caused young men to be single, this would have a negligible impact on a country\u2019s proportion of single young men, thereby explaining why marital status is uncorrelated with political violence at the national level. It would also explain why the individual-level evidence shows that most terrorists and guerillas are single.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5f20\u66fc\u5a1c<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u91d1\u78ca<\/span><\/p>\n


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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Monetary Power Reconsidered: The Struggle between the Bundesbank and the Fed over Monetary Leadership<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Arie Krampf\uff0c\u5e0c\u4f2f\u6765\u5927\u5b66\u8bb2\u5e08<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u672c\u6587\u91cd\u65b0\u5ba1\u89c6\u4e86\u4f20\u7edf\u7684\u8d27\u5e01\u6743\u529b\u7406\u8bba\uff0c\u4ee5\u89e3\u91ca\u5fb7\u610f\u5fd7\u8054\u90a6\u94f6\u884c\uff08\u4ee5\u53ca\u5fb7\u56fd\uff09\u572820\u4e16\u7eaa80\u5e74\u4ee3\u672b90\u5e74\u4ee3\u521d\u57fa\u4e8e\u89c4\u5219\u7684\u4f4e\u901a\u80c0\u5236\u51fa\u73b0\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u6240\u626e\u6f14\u7684\u89d2\u8272\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u63d0\u51fa\u7684\u8d27\u5e01\u6743\u529b\u7406\u8bba\u5219\u501f\u9274\u4e86\u5236\u5ea6\u6027\u6743\u529b\u7684\u7406\u5ff5\u4e0e\u8d27\u5e01\u9886\u5bfc\u6743\u7684\u6982\u5ff5\uff08\u5236\u5ea6\u6027\u8d27\u5e01\u6743\u529b\u4e5f\u88ab\u7406\u89e3\u4e3a\u4e00\u56fd\u5438\u5f15\u5916\u8d44\u7684\u80fd\u529b\uff09\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u89e3\u91ca\u4e86\u56fd\u5185\u5236\u5ea6\u6027\u7279\u5f81\u548c\u5076\u7136\u7684\u5386\u53f2\u4e8b\u4ef6\u5f71\u54cd\u4e00\u56fd\u5916\u90e8\u8d27\u5e01\u6743\u529b\u7684\u65b9\u5f0f\u3002<\/span>\u4f5c\u8005\u5e94\u7528\u8fd9\u4e00\u7406\u8bba\u8ffd\u6eaf\u4e861989\u5e74\u5fb7\u610f\u5fd7\u8054\u90a6\u94f6\u884c\u201c\u4e00\u610f\u5b64\u884c\u201d\u7684\u8d27\u5e01\u7d27\u7f29\u653f\u7b56\u5f15\u53d1\u4e00\u7cfb\u5217\u8de8\u56fd\u4e8b\u4ef6\u7684\u8fc7\u7a0b\uff0c\u8ba4\u4e3a\u8fd9\u4e00\u7cfb\u5217\u4e8b\u4ef6\u4ee5\u7b26\u5408\u5fb7\u56fd\u5229\u76ca\u7684\u65b9\u5f0f\u6539\u53d8\u4e86\u56fd\u9645\u8d27\u5e01\u79e9\u5e8f\uff0c\u5373\u56fd\u9645\u8d27\u5e01\u79e9\u5e8f\u4ece\u7531\u7f8e\u56fd\u4e3b\u5bfc\u7684\u5b9e\u7528\u4e3b\u4e49\u56fd\u9645\u5b8f\u89c2\u7ecf\u6d4e\u534f\u8c03\u8def\u5f84\u8f6c\u53d8\u4e3a\u57fa\u4e8e\u89c4\u5219\u7684\u4f4e\u901a\u80c0\u76ee\u6807\u8def\u5f84\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u8ba4\u4e3a\uff0c\u5c3d\u7ba1\u5b58\u5728\u7740\u7f8e\u8054\u50a8\u548c\u7f8e\u56fd\u8d22\u653f\u90e8\u7684\u53cd\u5bf9\uff0c\u56fd\u9645\u8d27\u5e01\u79e9\u5e8f\u8fd8\u662f\u53d1\u751f\u4e86\u4ee5\u4e0a\u53d8\u5316\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u5bf9\u7814\u7a76\u7f8e\u56fd\u9738\u6743\u7684\u8870\u843d\u548c\u56fd\u9645\u5236\u5ea6\u7684\u53d8\u8fc1\u673a\u5236\u90fd\u6709\u6240\u8d21\u732e\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u4e5f\u4e3a\u5f53\u524d\u5b66\u672f\u754c\u4e89\u8bba\u57fa\u4e8e\u89c4\u5219\u7684\u4e16\u754c\u79e9\u5e8f\u662f\u5426\u53ef\u80fd\u8870\u843d\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e86\u65b0\u7684\u7ebf\u7d22\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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This article reexamines the theory of monetary power to explain the role of the Bundesbank (and Germany) in the emergence of the rules-based low inflation regime in the late1980s and early 1990s. Our theory of monetary power draws on the notion of institutional power and the concept of monetary leadership, understood as the capacity to attract foreign investment, and thereby explains how domestic institutional features and contingent historical events affect countries\u2019 external monetary power. This theory is employed to trace how the Bundesbank go-it-alone strategy in 1989 triggered a cross national sequence of events that changed the international monetary order in a way that was consistent with the German interests. The transition was marked by a shift from the US-led pragmatist approach of international macroeconomic coordination to a rules-based approach founded on the principle of low inflation targeting. The article argues that this change took place despite the opposition of the Fed and the US Treasury. The article contributes to the literature on the decline of US hegemonic power as well as the literature on the mechanism of institutional change at the international level. It also sheds new light on current debates about the putative decline of the rules-based world order.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5218\u745b\u741b<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u8521\u5b87<\/span><\/p>\n


<\/p>\n<\/section>\n

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4.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5:\u4ee5\u533a\u57df\u8bae\u4f1a\u5316\u4e3a\u4f8b<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Legitimacy and the Cognitive of International Institutional Change: The Case of Regional Paliamentarization<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Tobias Lenz tobias\uff0c\u54e5\u6839\u5ef7\u5927\u5b66\u5168\u7403\u6cbb\u7406\u4e0e\u6bd4\u8f83\u5730\u533a\u4e3b\u4e49\u548c\u6c49\u5821\u5fb7\u56fd\u5168\u7403\u4e0e\u533a\u57df\u7814\u7a76\u52a9\u7406\u6559\u6388\uff1b<\/span>Alexandr Burilkov\uff0c\u5e03\u62c9\u683c\u5927\u90fd\u4f1a\u5927\u5b66\u7814\u7a76\u5458\u548c\u67cf\u6797\u81ea\u7531\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u5b66\u6559\u6388<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u662f\u5982\u4f55\u4ee5\u53ca\u5728\u4ec0\u4e48\u6761\u4ef6\u4e0b\u4f1a\u5f71\u54cd\u56fd\u9645\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u7684\u8fdb\u7a0b? \u672c\u6587\u4ece\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u7684\u4e00\u81f4\u6027\u6a21\u5f0f\u4e0e\u8ba4\u77e5\u6a21\u5f0f\u4e2d\u63a8\u5bfc\u51fa\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u9a71\u52a8\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u7684\u4e09\u79cd\u673a\u5236\uff0c\u5373\u5236\u5ea6\u673a\u5236\u3001\u89c4\u8303\u673a\u5236\u4e0e\u8ba4\u77e5\u673a\u5236\u3002<\/span>\u6587\u7ae0\u8be6\u7ec6\u9610\u8ff0\u5e76\u8bc4\u4ef7\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e09\u79cd\u56e0\u679c\u673a\u5236\uff0c\u8ba4\u4e3a\u8ba4\u77e5\u56e0\u7d20\u662f\u4e00\u4e2a\u91cd\u8981\u4f46\u8fc4\u4eca\u88ab\u5ffd\u89c6\u7684\u3001\u57fa\u4e8e\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u7684\u53d8\u9769\u6765\u6e90\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u5229\u75281950\u5e74\u81f32010\u5e74\u95f436\u4e2a\u533a\u57df\u7ec4\u7ec7\u5efa\u7acb\u8bae\u4f1a\u673a\u6784\u7684\u6570\u636e\u5bf9\u4ee5\u4e0a\u4e09\u79cd\u673a\u5236\u8fdb\u884c\u8bc4\u4f30\u3002<\/span>\u4f5c\u8005\u53d1\u73b0\u8d4b\u4e88\u8d85\u56fd\u5bb6\u79d8\u4e66\u5904\u6743\u529b\u3001\u4e0e\u6b27\u76df\u8fdb\u884c\u63a5\u89e6\u4ee5\u53ca\u6709\u7ec4\u7ec7\u7684\u90bb\u56fd\u671d\u8bae\u4f1a\u5316\u65b9\u5411\u7684\u53d1\u5c55\uff0c\u90fd\u589e\u52a0\u4e86\u533a\u57df\u8bae\u4f1a\u5316\u7684\u53ef\u80fd\u6027\u3002<\/span>\u533a\u57df\u8bae\u4f1a\u5316\u662f\u6307\u4e00\u4e2a\u8bae\u4f1a\u673a\u6784\u83b7\u5f97\u6b63\u5f0f\u53c2\u4e0e\u533a\u57df\u7ec4\u7ec7\u51b3\u7b56\u8d44\u683c\u7684\u8fc7\u7a0b\u3002<\/span>\u6587\u7ae0\u901a\u8fc7\u6848\u4f8b\u5b9e\u8bc1\u8868\u660e\u57fa\u4e8e\u8ba4\u77e5\u53c2\u7167\u7684\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u5224\u65ad\u662f\u56fd\u9645\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u7684\u91cd\u8981\u6765\u6e90\uff0c\u5408\u6cd5\u6027\u53d8\u5316\u6709\u52a9\u4e8e\u89e3\u91ca\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u4f1a\u5728\u4f55\u65f6\u53d1\u751f\u4ee5\u53ca\u4f55\u79cd\u5236\u5ea6\u53d8\u8fc1\u4f1a\u4ea7\u751f\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u4ee5\u4e1c\u5357\u4e9a\u56fd\u5bb6\u8054\u76df\u7684\u8bae\u4f1a\u5316\u73b0\u8c61\u4e3a\u4f8b\uff0c\u9610\u660e\u5176\u6f5c\u5728\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5\u6a21\u4eff\u673a\u5236\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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How and under what conditions does legitimacy affect processes of international institutional change? We explicate three mechanisms of legitimacy-driven institutional change that we derive from two distinct models of legitimacy. This article speci\ufb01es and evaluates three causal mechanisms by which variation in legitimacy induces institutional change in international organizations (IOs) and argues that an important, yet hitherto neglected, source of legitimacy-based change is cognitive in nature. Using survival analysis, we evaluate these mechanisms with a novel dataset on the establishment of parliamentary institutions in thirty-six regional organizations between 1950 and 2010. We \ufb01nd that the empowerment of supranational secretariats, engagement with the European Union, and parliamentarization in an organization\u2019s neighborhood increase the likelihood of regional parliamentarization. Regional parliamentarization is the process by which a parliamentary institution acquires formalized access to participate in the decision-making of a regional organization. This suggests that legitimacy judgments that draw on cognitive referents provide an important source of international institutional change. We argue that variation in legitimacy can help to explain when institutional change occurs and what kind of institutional change will be attempted. We illustrate the underlying cognitive emulation mechanism with a case study of parliamentarization in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/strong>\u5f20\u664b\u5c9a<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u91d1\u7433<\/span><\/p>\n


\n<\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n

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5.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u5408\u4f5c\u7684\u9634\u6697\u9762\uff1a\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\u4e0e\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u8150\u8d25<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Emilie M. Hafner-Burton\uff0c\u52a0\u5dde\u5927\u5b66\u5723\u8fed\u6208\u5206\u6821\u5168\u7403\u653f\u7b56\u4e0e\u6218\u7565\u5b66\u9662\u6559\uff1b<\/span>Christina J. Schneide\uff0c\u52a0\u5dde\u5927\u5b66\u5723\u8fed\u6208\u5206\u6821\u653f\u6cbb\u5b66\u526f\u6559\u6388<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u653f\u6cbb\u8150\u8d25\u5728\u4e16\u754c\u4e0a\u8bb8\u591a\u5730\u65b9\u90fd\u5341\u5206\u7316\u7357\uff0c\u4e14\u5177\u6709\u7834\u574f\u6027\u3002<\/span>\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u591a\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\u58f0\u79f0\u5c06\u901a\u8fc7\u5584\u6cbb\u89c4\u8303\u548c\u89c4\u5219\u6765\u89e3\u51b3\u8fd9\u4e00\u95ee\u9898\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u5236\u5b9a\u53cd\u8150\u6807\u51c6\u5e76\u5b9e\u65bd\u53cd\u8150\u884c\u52a8\u3002<\/span>\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\u662f\u5426\u80fd\u904f\u5236\u8150\u8d25\u4ecd\u6709\u5f85\u8003\u91cf\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u8ba4\u4e3a\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u7684\u6027\u8d28\u51b3\u5b9a\u4e86\u8150\u8d25\u662f\u5426\u4f1a\u88ab\u5bb9\u5fcd\uff0c\u4e5f\u51b3\u5b9a\u4e86\u6b63\u5f0f\u7684\u53cd\u8150\u89c4\u5219\u80fd\u591f\u5728\u591a\u5927\u7a0b\u5ea6\u4e0a\u6709\u6548\u5730\u6253\u51fb\u8150\u8d25\u3002<\/span>\u9996\u5148\uff0c\u8bb8\u591a\u8150\u8d25\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u4e0d\u652f\u6301\u7528\u5584\u6cbb\u89c4\u8303\u6216\u89c4\u5219\u5bf9\u5176\u4ed6\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u8fdb\u884c\u7ea6\u675f\uff0c\u8fd9\u4f7f\u5f97\u5bf9\u8150\u8d25\u7684\u60e9\u7f5a\u5931\u53bb\u516c\u4fe1\u529b\u3002<\/span>\u5176\u6b21\uff0c\u9886\u5bfc\u8005\u53ef\u80fd\u4ece\u5176\u4ed6\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u90a3\u91cc\u770b\u5230\u8150\u8d25\u7684\u4ef7\u503c\uff0c\u5e76\u5b66\u4f1a\u4ee5\u540c\u6837\u7684\u65b9\u5f0f\u884c\u4e8b\u3002<\/span>\u672c\u6587\u641c\u96c6\u4e86\u5404\u7c7b\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u6700\u65b0\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\u53cd\u8150\u51b3\u8bae\uff0c\u5e76\u901a\u8fc7\u5404\u79cd\u8bc4\u4f30\u7b56\u7565\u8bc1\u660e\uff1a<\/span>(1)\u4e00\u4e2a\u56fd\u5bb6\u5982\u679c\u52a0\u5165\u4e00\u4e2a\u6210\u5458\u56fd\u660e\u663e\u8150\u8d25\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\uff0c\u4f1a\u66f4\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u8d2a\u6c61\u8150\u8d25\uff0c\u4e14\u968f\u7740\u65f6\u95f4\u7684\u79ef\u7d2f\u800c\u6108\u53d1\u4e25\u91cd\u3002<\/span>(2)\u540c\u65f6\u8fd9\u79cd\u5bf9\u8150\u8d25\u7684\u5bb9\u5fcd\u751a\u81f3\u51fa\u73b0\u5728\u90a3\u4e9b\u5df2\u7ecf\u6b63\u5f0f\u901a\u8fc7\u53cd\u8150\u51b3\u8bae\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u7ec4\u7ec7\u4e2d\uff0c\u8fd9\u4f7f\u5f97\u5584\u6cbb\u89c4\u5219\u5728\u88ab\u8d2a\u8150\u4e3b\u5bfc\u7684\u7ec4\u7ec7\u4e2d\u57fa\u672c\u6210\u4e3a\u7a7a\u8c08\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

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Political corruption is rampant in\u2014and destructive to\u2014many parts of the world. A growing number of international organizations (IOs) claim to address the problem by encouraging good governance norms and rules, such as anti-corruption standards and practices. Whether membership in IOs dampens corruption, however, is unclear. The central argument is that the characteristics of IO membership determine both whether corruption is tolerated and the extent to which formal anti-corruption rules effectively combat the problem. First, groups of corrupt states are reticent to enforce good governance norms or rules against other IO members, rendering punishment for corruption incredible. Second, leaders may witness the value of corruption to their IO peers and learn to act the same way. Using a variety of data sources and estimation strategies, including new data on IO anti-corruption mandates, the authors demonstrate that: (1) countries that participate in member-corrupted IOs are significantly more likely to engage in corruption themselves\u2014and experience an increase in corruption over time\u2014than are countries that participate in less corrupt IOs; and (2) this tolerance for corruption occurs even within IOs that have adopted formal anti-corruption mandates, rendering good governance rules largely cheap talk among organizations governed by corrupt principles.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5218\u6f47\u6631<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u91d1\u78ca<\/span><\/p>\n


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6.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u56fd\u9645\u8c08\u5224\u4e2d\u6cc4\u5bc6\u7684\u539f\u56e0\u548c\u5f71\u54cd<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>The Cause and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiation<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Matthew Castle\uff0c\u65b0\u897f\u5170\u60e0\u7075\u987f\u7ef4\u591a\u5229\u4e9a\u5927\u5b66\u5386\u53f2\u3001\u54f2\u5b66\u3001\u653f\u6cbb\u79d1\u5b66\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u9662\u8bb2\u5e08\uff1b<\/span>Krzysztof  J. Pelc\uff0c\u52a0\u62ff\u5927\u9ea6\u5409\u5c14\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u79d1\u5b66\u7cfb\u52a9\u7406\u6559\u6388<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u56fd\u9645\u8c08\u5224\u4ee5\u4fdd\u5bc6\u4e3a\u57fa\u7840\u3002<\/span>\u5c3d\u7ba1\u5982\u6b64\uff0c\u5bf9\u8c08\u5224\u6587\u4ef6\u7684\u975e\u6743\u5a01\u6027\u6cc4\u9732\u65e5\u6e10\u9891\u7e41\u3002<\/span>\u8c08\u5224\u6587\u4ef6\u6cc4\u5bc6\u80cc\u540e\u7684\u9a71\u52a8\u56e0\u7d20\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48\uff1f<\/span>\u6cc4\u5bc6\u5bf9\u56fd\u5bb6\u95f4\u8c08\u5224\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u53c8\u662f\u4ec0\u4e48\uff1f<\/span>\u7279\u522b\u662f\uff0c\u6cc4\u5bc6\u662f\u8fdb\u653b\u6027\u7684\u8fd8\u662f\u9632\u5fa1\u6027\u7684\uff0c\u4e5f\u5c31\u662f\u8bf4\uff0c\u5176\u76ee\u7684\u5728\u4e8e\u63a8\u52a8\u5404\u65b9\u8fdb\u884c\u66f4\u79ef\u6781\u7684\u51b3\u7b56\uff0c\u8fd8\u662f\u65e8\u5728\u6536\u56de\u5df2\u7ecf\u505a\u51fa\u7684\u51b3\u7b56\uff1f<\/span>\u7531\u4e8e\u8d38\u6613\u8c08\u5224\u5177\u6709\u53cd\u590d\u6027\uff0c\u5176\u6240\u80fd\u63d0\u4f9b\u7684\u7ecf\u9a8c\u8bc1\u636e\u662f\u5176\u4ed6\u6848\u4f8b\u4e0d\u53ef\u6bd4\u62df\u7684\uff0c\u56e0\u6b64\u672c\u6587\u4ee5\u8d38\u6613\u8c08\u5224\u4e3a\u80cc\u666f\u8003\u5bdf\u4e86\u4ee5\u4e0a\u95ee\u9898\u3002<\/span>\u4e3a\u6b64\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u96c6\u5408\u4e86\u6b64\u7c7b\u6570\u636e\u5e93\uff0c\u7edf\u8ba1\u4e862006\uff5e2015\u5e74\u95f4120\u4f8b\u8c08\u5224\u6cc4\u5bc6\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\u3002<\/span>\u4f5c\u8005\u53d1\u73b0\uff0c\u8c08\u5224\u6cc4\u5bc6\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\u6b63\u4e0d\u65ad\u589e\u52a0\u3002<\/span>\u6cc4\u5bc6\u5f80\u5f80\u96c6\u4e2d\u4e8e\u65b0\u578b\u6cd5\u5f8b\u6761\u4f8b\uff0c\u5e76\u4e0d\u6210\u6bd4\u4f8b\u5730\u96c6\u4e2d\u4e8e\u9632\u5fa1\u6027\u5c42\u9762\uff08\u5373\u6cc4\u5bc6\u6ee1\u8db3\u4e86\u90a3\u4e9b\u4f01\u56fe\u9650\u5236\u5df2\u505a\u51fa\u7684\u627f\u8bfa\u7684\u884c\u4e3a\u4f53\uff09\u3002<\/span>\u4e16\u754c\u8c08\u5224\u4e2d\u6cc4\u5bc6\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\u4e2d\u5360\u5927\u591a\u6570\u53d1\u751f\u5728\u6b27\u76df\u3002<\/span>\u901a\u8fc7\u8fd0\u7528\u653f\u515a\u5ba3\u8a00\u6570\u636e(party manifesto data)\u8ddf\u8e2a\u6b27\u76df\u5185\u90e8\u7684\u610f\u8bc6\u5f62\u6001\u7acb\u573a\uff0c\u4f5c\u8005\u53d1\u73b0\u6cc4\u9732\u5f80\u5f80\u4e0e\u6b27\u76df\u653f\u515a\u5185\u5bf9\u7ecf\u6d4e\u81ea\u7531\u5316\u7684\u53cd\u5bf9\u6709\u5173\u3002<\/span>\u540c\u65f6\uff0c\u6cc4\u5bc6\u5728\u8f6c\u79fb\u516c\u5171\u8206\u8bba\u65b9\u9762\u5341\u5206\u6709\u6548\u3002<\/span>\u9488\u5bf9\u6b27\u76df\u4e0e\u52a0\u62ff\u5927\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u4e00\u573a\u8c08\u5224\u6cc4\u5bc6\uff0c\u4f5c\u8005\u5ba1\u67e5\u4e86\u8fd9\u573a\u8c08\u5224\u4e2d\u8d38\u6613\u5b98\u5458\u95f4\u7684\u5185\u90e8\u901a\u4fe1\u4ee5\u53ca\u968f\u540e\u6709\u5173\u6cc4\u5bc6\u7684\u5a92\u4f53\u62a5\u9053\u3002<\/span>\u4f5c\u8005\u53d1\u73b0\uff0c\u4e0e\u5b98\u65b9\u53d1\u5e03\u7684\u8c08\u5224\u6587\u672c\u76f8\u6bd4\uff0c\u6cc4\u9732\u7684\u8c08\u5224\u6587\u672c\u5c06\u5e26\u6765\u66f4\u591a\u7684\u8d1f\u9762\u62a5\u9053\uff0c\u5373\u4fbf\u4e24\u8005\u5185\u5bb9\u76f8\u540c\u3002<\/span>\u603b\u800c\u8a00\u4e4b\uff0c\u653f\u6cbb\u884c\u4e3a\u4f53\u6709\u7b56\u7565\u5730\u6cc4\u9732\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u4ee5\u4fbf\u52a8\u5458\u56fd\u5185\u7fa4\u4f17\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u4f7f\u8c08\u5224\u7ed3\u679c\u8fbe\u5230\u4ed6\u4eec\u7684\u9884\u671f\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

International negotiations are founded on secrecy. Yet, unauthorized leaks of negotiating documents have grown common. What are the incentives behind leaks, and what are their effects on bargaining between states? Specifically, are leaks offensive or defensive: are they intended to spur parties to make more ambitious commitments, or are they more often intended to claw back commitments made? We examine these questions in the context of trade negotiations, the recurring form of which affords us rare empirical traction on an otherwise elusive issue. We assemble the first dataset of its kind, covering 120 discrete leaks from 2006 to 2015. We find that leaks are indeed rising in number. Leaks are clustered around novel legal provisions and appear to be disproportionately defensive: they serve those actors intent on limiting commitments made. The European Union (EU) appears responsible for the majority of leaks occurring worldwide. Using party manifesto data to track changing ideological positions within the EU, we find that the occurrence of leaks correlates with opposition to economic liberalization within the average EU political party. Moreover, leaks appear effective in shifting public debate. We examine trade officials\u2019 internal communications and media coverage in the wake of a specific leak of negotiations between Canada and the EU. A given negotiating text attracts more negative coverage when it is leaked than when the same text is officially released. In sum, political actors leak information strategically to mobilize domestic audiences toward their preferred negotiating outcome.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u8521\u5b87<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5218\u745b\u741b<\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n

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 \u626b\u4e0b\u65b9\u4e8c\u7ef4\u7801\u67e5\u770b\u5f80\u671f\u7cbe\u5f69 <\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c01\u671f | Review of International Studies  Vol.45, No.4, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c02\u671f | International Relations Vol.33, No.3, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c03\u671f | International Organization Vol.73, No.3, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c04\u671f | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c05\u671f | European Journal of International Relations<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c06\u671f | Security Studies, Vol.28, No.4, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c07\u671f|International Secur.ity, Vol 44, No. 2, 2019 | \u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c8\u671f| Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Vol.32,No.4<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c09\u671f| International Relations of Asia-Pacific Vol.19,No.3<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c10\u671f | International Studies Review, Volume.21, No.3, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c11\u671f|Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c12\u671f | International Affairs, Vol.95, No.6\uff0c2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c13\u671f|Chinese Journal of International Politics, No.4, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c14\u671f|Chinese Journal of International Politics, No.3, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011 \u7b2c15\u671f | International Organization, No.4, 2019<\/a><\/span><\/section>\n

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\u539f\u6587\u59cb\u53d1\u4e8e\u5fae\u4fe1\u516c\u4f17\u53f7\uff08\u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba\uff09\uff1a\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c16\u671f | International Studies Quarterly, No.4, 2019<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u671f\u520a\u7b80\u4ecb \u300a\u56fd\u9645\u7814\u7a76\u5b63\u520a\u300b\uff08Intern<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":15457,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[36,34],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15456"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15456"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15456\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15469,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15456\/revisions\/15469"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15457"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15456"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15456"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15456"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}