{"id":14686,"date":"2019-12-22T14:00:50","date_gmt":"2019-12-22T06:00:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2019\/12\/31\/edd37610b5\/"},"modified":"2020-01-05T22:44:03","modified_gmt":"2020-01-05T14:44:03","slug":"edd37610b5","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2019\/12\/22\/edd37610b5\/","title":{"rendered":"\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c13\u671f|Chinese Journal of International Politics, No.4, 2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\u300a\u4e2d\u56fd\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u6742\u5fd7\u300b\uff08The Chinese Journal of International Politics<\/em>\uff09\u6210\u7acb\u4e8e2006\u5e74\uff0c\u4e3b\u7f16\u662f\u5b59\u5b66\u5cf0\uff0c\u662f\u7531\u725b\u6d25\u5927\u5b66\u51fa\u7248\u793e\u6bcf\u5b63\u5ea6\u51fa\u7248\u7684\u7ecf\u540c\u884c\u8bc4\u8bae\u7684\u5b66\u672f\u671f\u520a\uff0c\u4ee5\u73b0\u4ee3\u65b9\u6cd5\u8bba\u4e3a\u57fa\u7840\u7814\u7a76\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u4e5f\u53d1\u8868\u5386\u53f2\u7814\u7a76\u548c\u653f\u7b56\u5bfc\u5411\u7684\u8bba\u6587\u3002\u8be5\u671f\u520a\u5927\u90e8\u5206\u6587\u7ae0\u6216\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u5173\uff0c\u6216\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u6709\u5f71\u54cd\u3002<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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1. \u4ece\u5929\u671d\u5230\u4e16\u754c\uff1a\u201c\u6587\u5316\u7406\u60f3\u4e3b\u4e49\u201d\u548c\u201c\u9053\u4e49\u73b0\u5b9e\u4e3b\u4e49\u201d\u2014\u2014\u5168\u7403\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u7684\u4e2d\u56fd\u8d21\u732e<\/strong><\/p>\n

From Heaven to Earth: \u2018Cultural Idealism\u2019 and \u2018Moral Realism\u2019 as Chinese Contributions to Global International Relations<\/span>
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2. \u5730\u7f18\u653f\u6cbb\u3001\u6c11\u65cf\u4e3b\u4e49\u4e0e\u5bf9\u5916\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\uff1a\u5bf9\u201c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5a01\u80c1\u201d\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5\u4e0e\u7f8e\u56fd\u516c\u4f17\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u5bf9\u7f8e\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u6001\u5ea6 <\/strong><\/section>\n

Geopolitics, Nationalism, and Foreign Direct Investment: Perceptions of the China Threat and American Public Attitudes toward Chinese FDI<\/p>\n


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3. \u8d70\u5411\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8131\u94a9? \u68b3\u7406\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u7684\u4e2d\u56fd\u8bdd\u8bed <\/strong><\/p>\n

Towards Economic Decoupling? Mapping Chinese Discourse on the China\u2013US Trade War<\/p>\n


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Rising Powers and Grassroots Image Management: Confucius Institutes and China in the Media <\/p>\n


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Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>From Heaven to Earth: \u2018Cultural Idealism\u2019 and \u2018Moral Realism\u2019 as Chinese Contributions to Global International Relations<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Amitav Acharya\uff0c\u8457\u540d\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7814\u7a76\u5b66\u8005\u3001\u7f8e\u5229\u575a\u5927\u5b66\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u4e13\u4e1a\u6770\u51fa\u6559\u6388\u3001\u56fd\u9645\u7814\u7a76\u534f\u4f1a\uff08ISA\uff09\u524d\u4e3b\u5e2d\u3002<\/span>
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\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011 <\/span><\/strong>\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u79d1\u56e0\u5ffd\u89c6\u6216\u8fb9\u7f18\u5316\u6838\u5fc3\u897f\u65b9\u56fd\u5bb6\u4ee5\u5916\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\u548c\u793e\u4f1a\u800c\u65e5\u76ca\u53d7\u5230\u6279\u8bc4\u3002\u201c\u5168\u7403\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u201d(Global IR)\u8fd9\u4e00\u6982\u5ff5\u81ea2004\u5e74\u63d0\u51fa\uff0c\u65e8\u5728\u5f25\u5408\u201c\u897f\u65b9\u4e0e\u975e\u897f\u65b9\u201d\uff08West and the Rest\uff09\u5206\u91ce\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u53d1\u5c55\u51fa\u4e00\u95e8\u66f4\u4e3a\u5305\u5bb9\u7684\u5b66\u79d1\uff0c\u5e76\u8ba4\u8bc6\u5230\u8fd9\u95e8\u5b66\u79d1\u57fa\u7840\u7684\u591a\u6837\u6027\u3002\u540c\u65f6\uff0c\u5b66\u754c\u4e5f\u5b58\u5728\u4e00\u79cd\u5728\u56fd\u5bb6\u6216\u533a\u57df\u7684\u57fa\u7840\u4e0a\u53d1\u5c55\u7406\u8bba\u6216\u8005\u201c\u5b66\u6d3e\u201d\u7684\u8d8b\u52bf\uff0c\u4ee5\u4e2d\u56fd\u6700\u4e3a\u663e\u8457\u3002\u672c\u6587\u8003\u5bdf\u4e86\u4e00\u4e9b\u5174\u8d77\u4e8e\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u6784\u5efa\uff0c\u4f8b\u5982\u201c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u6d3e\u201d(Chinese School of IR)\u7684\u5960\u57fa\u4eba\u2014\u2014\u79e6\u4e9a\u9752\u7684\u201c\u5173\u7cfb\u7406\u8bba\u201d(Relational Theory),\u8d75\u6c40\u9633\u7684\u9002\u7528\u4e8e\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u4e0e\u4e16\u754c\u79e9\u5e8f\u7814\u7a76\u7684\u201c\u5929\u4e0b\u201d(all under Heaven)\uff0c\u4ee5\u53ca\u201c\u6e05\u534e\u5b66\u6d3e\u201d(Tsinghua School)\u7684\u9886\u519b\u4eba\u7269\u2014\u2014\u960e\u5b66\u901a\u7684\u201c\u9053\u4e49\u73b0\u5b9e\u4e3b\u4e49\u201d(Moral Realism)\u7b49\u3002\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u56fd\u5185\u5916\u7684\u5f88\u591a\u5b66\u8005\u6765\u8bf4\uff0c\u8bb8\u591a\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u6cd5\u4e0e\u5b83\u4eec\u5bf9\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u9886\u57df\u505a\u51fa\u7684\u8d21\u732e\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u662f\u4e0d\u660e\u786e\u7684\u3002\u672c\u6587\u5e76\u975e\u63cf\u8ff0\u4e2d\u56fd\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u6cd5\u7684\u72ec\u7279\u4e4b\u5904\u4e0e\u590d\u6742\u4e4b\u5904\uff0c\u800c\u662f\u5e0c\u671b\u80fd\u591f\u4fc3\u8fdb\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u8005\u4e0e\u5176\u4ed6\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b66\u8005\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u5bf9\u8bdd\uff0c\u4ee5\u671f\u4f7f\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u8005\u66f4\u6e05\u695a\u5730\u8ba4\u8bc6\u5230\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u6cd5\u5bf9\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7814\u7a76\u7684\u91cd\u8981\u6027\u3002\u540c\u65f6\uff0c\u4f5c\u8005\u8bba\u8bc1\u4e86\u5c3d\u7ba1\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u6cd5\u505a\u51fa\u4e86\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u8d21\u732e\uff0c\u4f46\u662f\u5176\u5728\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7406\u8bba\uff08International Relations Theory\uff09\u65b9\u9762\u4ecd\u7136\u9762\u4e34\u7740\u5f88\u591a\u6311\u6218\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u5305\u62ec\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u8005\u9700\u8981\u63d0\u4f9b\u66f4\u5177\u6709\u8bf4\u670d\u529b\u7684\u8bc1\u636e\u6765\u8bc1\u660e\u4ed6\u4eec\u63d0\u51fa\u7684\u6982\u5ff5\u548c\u89e3\u91ca\u80fd\u591f\u5e94\u7528\u4e8e\u5176\u5b83\u793e\u4f1a\u4ee5\u53ca\u66f4\u666e\u904d\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u3002\u6b64\u5916\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u6cd5\u4e5f\u9700\u8981\u5728\u4e16\u754c\u8303\u56f4\u5185\u5438\u5f15\u5927\u91cf\u652f\u6301\u8005\uff0c\u9f13\u52b1\u5176\u4ed6\u5b66\u8005\uff08\u5c24\u5176\u662f\u9752\u5e74\u5b66\u8005\uff09\u7814\u7a76\u8bae\u7a0b\u7684\u8bbe\u5b9a\uff0c\u5e76\u4e14\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b98\u65b9\u7684\u653f\u7b56\u6846\u67b6\u4fdd\u6301\u8ddd\u79bb\u3002\u5168\u7403\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u4e3a\u5f3a\u8c03\u6216\u8005\u5e94\u5bf9\u4e0a\u8ff0\u6311\u6218\uff0c\u5c24\u5176\u662f\u5728\u907f\u514d\u6587\u5316\u4f8b\u5916\u4e3b\u4e49(cultural exceptionalism)\u548c\u786e\u4fdd\u5176\u5728\u4e2d\u56fd\u8303\u56f4\u4e4b\u5916\u7684\u76f8\u5173\u6027\u65b9\u9762\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e86\u4e00\u79cd\u6709\u76ca\u7684\u6846\u67b6\u3002<\/span>
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The discipline of International Relations (IR) is increasingly being criticized for ignoring and marginalizing states and societies outside of the core countries of the West. The idea of a \u2018Global IR\u2019 has been proposed since 2014 a pathway toward a bridging the \u2018West and the Rest\u2019 divide and thus develop a more inclusive discipline, recognizing its multiple and diverse foundations. At the same time, there is a trend toward developing theories, or \u2018schools\u2019, on a national or regional basis, the leading examples of which come from China. This article examines some theoretical constructs emerging in China, such as the \u2018Relational Theory\u2019 of Qin Yaqing, who is the foundational scholar in the \u2018Chinese School of IR\u2019, the Tianxia (\u2018all under Heaven\u2019) concept as applied to IR and world order by Zhao Tingyang, and \u2018Moral Realism\u2019 of Yan Xuetong, who is the leading figure of the \u2018Tsinghua School\u2019. To many scholars, both inside and outside China, the relationship among the various Chinese approaches and their overall contribution to the IR field remain unclear. Without claiming to capture all their nuances and complexity, this article hopes to stimulate a conversation among scholars, Chinese and foreign, with a view to generate greater clarity and highlight their importance to the study of IR. I argue that while making important contributions, the Chinese approaches to International Relations Theory (IRT) also face a number of challenges. This includes the need for them to offer more convincing proof that the concepts and explanations they propose can apply to other societies and to IR more generally. Moreover, there is the need for these approaches to attract a critical mass of followers worldwide, stimulate a research agenda for other, especially younger scholars, and distance themselves from the official Chinese policy framings. The Global IR approach offers a helpful framework for highlighting and perhaps addressing these challenges, especially in avoiding cultural exceptionalism and ensuring their wider relevance beyond China.<\/section>\n


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\u5730\u7f18\u653f\u6cbb\u3001\u6c11\u65cf\u4e3b\u4e49\u4e0e\u5bf9\u5916\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\uff1a\u5bf9\u201c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5a01\u80c1\u201d\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5\u4e0e\u7f8e\u56fd\u516c\u4f17\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u5bf9\u7f8e\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u6001\u5ea6 <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Geopolitics, Nationalism, and Foreign Direct Investment: Perceptions of the China Threat and American Public Attitudes toward Chinese FDI<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Ka Zeng\uff0c\u963f\u80af\u8272\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u5b66\u6559\u6388\uff1bXiaojun Li\uff0c\u4e0d\u5217\u98a0\u54e5\u4f26\u6bd4\u4e9a\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u5b66\u7cfb\u52a9\u7406\u6559\u6388<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/strong>\u8fd1\u5e74\u6765\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5bf9\u5916\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\uff08FDI\uff09\u5feb\u901f\u589e\u957f\uff0c\u8fd9\u5bf9\u4e1c\u9053\u56fd\u9020\u6210\u7684\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e0e\u653f\u6cbb\u5f71\u54cd\u6108\u53d1\u5f15\u8d77\u5b66\u754c\u5174\u8da3\u3002\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u51e0\u4e4e\u6ca1\u6709\u7814\u7a76\u5173\u6ce8\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u5d1b\u8d77\u7684\u62c5\u5fe7\u5982\u4f55\u5851\u9020\u516c\u4f17\u5bf9\u8fd9\u7c7b\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u6001\u5ea6\u3002\u672c\u6587\u68c0\u9a8c\u7f8e\u56fd\uff08\u516c\u4f17\uff09\u7684\u5a01\u80c1\u8ba4\u77e5\u4e0e\u5176\u5bf9\uff08\u4e2d\u56fd\uff09\u5bf9\u7f8e\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u504f\u597d\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u8054\u7cfb\u3002\u672c\u6587\u8ba4\u4e3a\uff0c\u7531\u4e8e\u5730\u7f18\u653f\u6cbb\u62c5\u5fe7\u548c\u6c11\u65cf\u4e3b\u4e49\u7684\u52a0\u5267\uff0c\u5bf9\u201c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5a01\u80c1\u201d\u7684\u8ba4\u77e5\u5bf9\u7f8e\u56fd\u516c\u4f17\u5173\u4e8e\u672a\u6765\u4e2d\u56fd\u5bf9\u7f8e\u76f4\u63a5\u6295\u8d44\u7684\u4f5c\u7528\u7684\u770b\u6cd5\u6709\u8d1f\u9762\u5f71\u54cd\u3002\u672c\u6587\u5229\u7528\u4e00\u9879\u8c03\u67e5\u5b9e\u9a8c\u8bf4\u660e\uff0c\u5f53\u53d7\u8bbf\u8005\u88ab\u4e8b\u5148\u544a\u77e5\u5f3a\u8c03\u4e2d\u56fd\u5e26\u6765\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u548c\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5a01\u80c1\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u65f6\uff0c\u6bd4\u8d77\u6ca1\u6709\u6536\u5230\u8fd9\u79cd\u4e8b\u5148\u544a\u77e5\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\uff0c\u4ed6\u4eec\u7684\u786e\u66f4\u4e0d\u6613\u652f\u6301\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684FDI\u3002\u6b64\u5916\uff0c\u56e0\u679c\u4e2d\u4ecb\u5206\u6790\uff08causal mediation analysis\uff09\u663e\u793a\uff0c\u5b89\u5168\u548c\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5a01\u80c1\u7684\u5904\u7406\u6548\u5e94\uff08treatment effect\uff09\u901a\u8fc7\u53d7\u8bbf\u8005\u5173\u4e8e\u4e2d\u56fdFDI\u5bf9\u7f8e\u56fd\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e0e\u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168\u5e26\u6765\u6311\u6218\u7684\u62c5\u5fe7\u8fd9\u4e00\u4e2d\u4ecb\u53d8\u91cf\u53d1\u6325\u6548\u679c\u3002<\/section>\n


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The rapid increase in recent years of Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) has prompted growing scholarly interest in its economic and political implications for host countries. However, relatively little attention has been paid to how concerns over the rise of China may shape public attitudes towards such investment. This article tests the link between threat perception and preferences for FDI in the United States. We argue that, due to heightened geopolitical concerns and nationalism, perceptions of the China threat negatively affect how the American public views the impact of incoming Chinese FDI. Using a survey experiment, we show that respondents are indeed less likely to support Chinese FDI when primed with information that highlights the security and economic threats posed by China than when they receive no such priming. Furthermore, causal mediation analyses reveal that the treatment effects of security and economic threats are mediated by respondents\u2019 concerns about the challenges that Chinese FDI poses to national security as well as to American economy.<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/strong>\u5468\u73ab\u7433<\/section>\n
\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011<\/strong>\u8bb8\u6587\u5a77<\/section>\n<\/section>\n
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\u8d70\u5411\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8131\u94a9? \u68b3\u7406\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u7684\u4e2d\u56fd\u8bdd\u8bed <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Towards Economic Decoupling? Mapping Chinese Discourse on the China\u2013US Trade War<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>\u674e\u5dcd\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u5927\u5b66\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u9662\u6559\u6388\uff0c\u7814\u7a76\u65b9\u5411\u4e3a\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7406\u8bba\u3001\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5b66\u3001\u7f8e\u56fd\u56fd\u9645\u7ecf\u6d4e\u653f\u7b56\u53ca\u4e2d\u56fd\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5916\u4ea4\u3002<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/strong>\u81ea\u7279\u6717\u666e\u5c31\u4efb\u7f8e\u56fd\u603b\u7edf\u4ee5\u6765\uff0c\u4e2d\u7f8e\u5173\u7cfb\u53d1\u751f\u4e86\u8bb8\u591a\u53d8\u5316\uff0c\u5176\u4e2d\u6700\u91cd\u8981\u7684\u4e8b\u4ef6\u662f\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u7684\u7206\u53d1\u3002\u5176\u89c4\u6a21\u548c\u5f71\u54cd\u4e4b\u5927\u524d\u6240\u672a\u6709\uff0c\u5728\u4e2d\u56fd\u5f15\u8d77\u4e86\u5e7f\u6cdb\u5173\u6ce8\u4e0e\u4e89\u8bae\u3002\u672c\u6587\u65e8\u5728\u56de\u987e\u7279\u6717\u666e\u653f\u5e9c\u4e0a\u53f0\u4ee5\u6765\u7684\u4e09\u5e74\u65f6\u95f4\u91cc\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u5f71\u54cd\u529b\u7684\u77e5\u8bc6\u5206\u5b50\u53ca\u8457\u540d\u601d\u60f3\u5bb6\u5c31\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u8fdb\u884c\u8bba\u4e89\u7684\u56db\u4e2a\u4e3b\u8981\u9636\u6bb5\u3002\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u8005\u6700\u521d\u7684\u4e89\u8bba\u5728\u4e8e\u662f\u5426\u4f1a\u53d1\u751f\u8d38\u6613\u6218\uff0c\u51fa\u73b0\u4e86\u4e50\u89c2\u4e0e\u60b2\u89c2\u7684\u533a\u5206\u3002\u4e0d\u4e45\u4e4b\u540e\u5728\u4e2d\u7f8e\u5173\u7cfb\u6025\u8f6c\u76f4\u4e0b\uff0c\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u4f3c\u4e4e\u96be\u4ee5\u907f\u514d\u4e4b\u65f6\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u8005\u5c06\u6ce8\u610f\u529b\u8f6c\u5411\u4e86\u7f8e\u56fd\u5bf9\u4e2d\u56fd\u53d1\u52a8\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u7684\u539f\u56e0\uff0c\u5f62\u6210\u4e86\u7ed3\u6784\u51b2\u7a81\u7406\u8bba\uff08structural conflict theory\uff09\u3001\u5236\u5ea6\u51b2\u7a81\u7406\u8bba\uff08institutional conflict theory\uff09\u548c\u56fd\u5185\u95ee\u9898\u8f93\u51fa\u7406\u8bba\uff08the theory on exporting domestic problems\uff09\u4e09\u4e2a\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u89e3\u91ca\u3002\u5728\u4e2d\u7f8e\u5f00\u59cb\u5bf9\u5f7c\u6b64\u7684\u51fa\u53e3\u8d27\u7269\u65bd\u52a0\u989d\u5916\u5173\u7a0e\uff0c\u4e2d\u5174\u901a\u8baf\u8bbe\u5907\u516c\u53f8\u53ca\u534e\u4e3a\u4e8b\u4ef6\u7206\u53d1\u4e4b\u65f6\uff0c\u5173\u4e8e\u5982\u4f55\u5e94\u5bf9\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u7684\u8bba\u4e89\u5728\u201c\u4e3e\u56fd\u4f53\u5236\u6d3e\u201d\uff08whole nation system school\uff09\u548c\u201c\u5e02\u573a\u6539\u9769\u6d3e\u201d\uff08market reform school\uff09\u4e4b\u95f4\u4ea7\u751f\u5206\u6b67\u3002\u5728\u5e94\u5bf9\u79d1\u6280\u6218\u7684\u95ee\u9898\u4e0a\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u77e5\u8bc6\u5206\u5b50\u5728\u201c\u81ea\u4e3b\u521b\u65b0\u201d\u548c\u201c\u5f00\u653e\u521b\u65b0\u201d\u7684\u9053\u8def\u4e0a\u5b58\u5728\u5206\u6b67\u3002\u6700\u8fd1\u591a\u79cd\u8ff9\u8c61\u8868\u660e\uff0c\u4e2d\u7f8e\u8d38\u6613\u6218\u53ef\u80fd\u65e0\u9650\u671f\u5730\u6301\u7eed\u4e0b\u53bb\uff0c\u4e24\u56fd\u7684\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8131\u94a9\u4e5f\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u53d1\u751f\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\u4e00\u573a\u6fc0\u70c8\u7684\u4e89\u8bba\u5df2\u7ecf\u5728\u4e24\u6d3e\u4e4b\u95f4\u5c55\u5f00:\u4e00\u6d3e\u4e3b\u5f20\u4e3a\u8fd9\u79cd\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8131\u94a9\u505a\u5145\u5206\u51c6\u5907\uff0c\u53e6\u4e00\u6d3e\u5219\u575a\u6301\u4e0e\u7f8e\u56fd\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8fdb\u4e00\u6b65\u6302\u94a9\u3002\u867d\u7136\u8fd9\u56db\u4e2a\u9636\u6bb5\u7684\u4e3b\u9898\u6709\u6240\u4e0d\u540c\uff0c\u4f46\u4e89\u8bba\u65b9\u7684\u6982\u5ff5\u672c\u8d28\u5177\u6709\u4e00\u5b9a\u7684\u4e00\u81f4\u6027\u3002\u5b83\u4eec\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u5206\u6b67\uff0c\u672c\u8d28\u4e0a\u662f\u5728\u56fd\u5bb6\u6743\u529b\u4e0e\u5e02\u573a\u529b\u91cf\u3001\u72ec\u7acb\u4e0e\u76f8\u4e92\u4f9d\u5b58\u3001\u6743\u529b\u7684\u96f6\u548c\u7ade\u4e89\u4e0e\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5408\u4f5c\u5171\u8d62\u7b49\u95ee\u9898\u4e0a\u7684\u5206\u6b67\u3002\u8fd9\u4e5f\u662f\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b66\u672f\u754c\u5bf9\u53e4\u5178\u653f\u6cbb\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5b66\u7684\u4e0d\u540c\u89c2\u70b9\u7684\u4e00\u4e2a\u4f8b\u8bc1\u3002<\/section>\n


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Tremendous changes have occurred in China\u2013US relations since Donald J. Trump took office in the White House, but the most significant event is the outbreak of the China\u2013US trade war, whose unprecedented scale and impact has drawn wide attention in China and sparked considerable debate. This article aims to review the four main stages of this great debate on the China\u2013US trade war among China\u2019s influential intellectuals and prominent thinkers. It covers the three-year period since beginning of the Trump administration. The initial argument among Chinese academics was whether or not there could ever be a trade war, which led to a dividing line between optimists and pessimists. Soon after, when China-US relations took a sharp downturn and a trade war seemed inevitable, Chinese scholars shifted their focus to reasons why the United States should wage a trade war against China. This culminated in three different perspectives embodied respectively in the structural conflict theory, institutional conflict theory, and the theory on exporting domestic problems. After China and the United States began slapping additional tariffs on one another\u2019s exported goods, and with the flare-up of the Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation (ZTE) and Huawei incidents, the debate on how to respond to a trade war cleaved between the \u2018whole nation system school\u2019 and the \u2018market reform school\u2019. As to coping with the technology war, Chinese intellectuals were divided between the paths of \u2018independent innovation\u2019 and \u2018open innovation\u2019. More recently, in view of the many signs that the China\u2013US trade war could continue indefinitely, and an economic decoupling of the two nations is no longer unimaginable, a fierce debate has arisen between those that advocate full preparations for such economic decoupling and those who insist on further links with the US economy. Although the main themes of the four stages of the debate differ somewhat, they share a certain degree of consistency as regards the conceptual pedigree of the debating parties. Their divergence derives, in essence, from different perspectives on such issues as state power versus market force, independence versus interdependence, and zero-sum competition of power versus win-win economic cooperation. This also exemplifies the competing views in Chinese academia on classical political economy.<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/strong>\u624e\u897f\u65fa\u59c6<\/section>\n
\u3010\u5ba1\u6821\u3011<\/strong>\u8bb8\u6587\u5a77<\/section>\n<\/section>\n
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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Rising Powers and Grassroots Image Management: Confucius Institutes and China in the Media<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Samuel Brazys\uff0c\u90fd\u67cf\u6797\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u9662\u526f\u6559\u6388\uff1bAlexander Dukalskis\uff0c\u90fd\u67cf\u6797\u5927\u5b66\u653f\u6cbb\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5b66\u52a9\u7406\u6559\u6388\u3002<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/strong>\u672c\u6587\u63d0\u51fa\u5e76\u68c0\u9a8c\u4e86\u4e00\u79cd\u6c11\u95f4\u5f62\u8c61\u7684\u7ba1\u7406\u673a\u5236\uff0c\u4ee5\u89e3\u91ca\u65b0\u5174\u5f3a\u6743\u5982\u4f55\u6253\u9020\u66f4\u6709\u5229\u4e8e\u5176\u5229\u76ca\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u73af\u5883\u3002\u5176\u76ee\u7684\u662f\u901a\u8fc7\u5f71\u54cd\u666e\u901a\u5916\u56fd\u6c11\u4f17\u7684\u77e5\u89c9\uff0c\u4fc3\u8fdb\u8be5\u56fd\u5916\u4ea4\u653f\u7b56\u76ee\u6807\u7684\u8fbe\u6210\u3002\u4e3a\u4e86\u68c0\u9a8c\u8fd9\u4e2a\u673a\u5236\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u5c06\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b54\u5b50\u5b66\u9662\uff08CIs\uff09\u89c6\u4e3a\u4e2d\u56fd\u6c11\u95f4\u5f62\u8c61\u7ba1\u7406\u7b56\u7565\u4e2d\u4e00\u79cd\u53ef\u89c2\u5bdf\u7684\u5de5\u5177\uff0c\u5e76\u8003\u5bdf\u4e86\u5176\u4ea7\u751f\u7684\u5f71\u54cd\u3002\u672c\u6587\u91c7\u7528\u4e86\u4e00\u79cd\u65f6\u7a7a\u65b9\u6cd5\uff08spatial-temporal approach\uff09\uff0c\u901a\u8fc7\u5168\u7403\u4e8b\u4ef6\u3001\u8bed\u8a00\u4e0e\u8bed\u8c03\u6570\u636e\u5e93\uff08GDELT\uff09\u7684\u6570\u636e\uff0c\u53d1\u73b0\u5bf9\u67d0\u4e2a\u6d3b\u8dc3\u7684\u5b54\u5b50\u5b66\u9662\u7684\u4eb2\u8fd1\uff0c\u4f1a\u4f7f\u5f53\u5730\u5a92\u4f53\u5728\u62a5\u9053\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u6709\u5173\u7684\u4e8b\u4ef6\u65f6\uff0c\u663e\u8457\u4e14\u5b9e\u8d28\u6027\u5730\u6539\u5584\u62a5\u9053\u65f6\u7684\u8bed\u8c03\u3002\u8fd9\u4e2a\u53d1\u73b0\u540c\u6837\u5728\u4e0d\u540c\u7684\u89c4\u8303\u4e0e\u4f30\u7b97\u7b56\u7565\u4e2d\u5f97\u5230\u652f\u6301\uff0c\u5176\u4e0e\u4f7f\u7528\u975e\u6d32\u6674\u96e8\u8868\uff08Afrobarometer\uff09\u6240\u751f\u6210\u7684\u5bb6\u5ead\u610f\u89c1\u6570\u636e\u7ed3\u679c\u5728\u5b9a\u6027\u4e0a\u662f\u4e00\u81f4\u7684\u3002\u7406\u8bba\u4e0a\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u7ed3\u679c\u8868\u660e\uff0c\u5bf9\u4e8e\u7406\u89e3\u8bdd\u8bed\u53d8\u5316\u7684\u91cd\u8981\u6027\u800c\u8a00\uff0c\u9664\u4e86\u5173\u6ce8\u7cbe\u82f1\u7684\u6001\u5ea6\u4e4b\u5916\uff0c\u7cfb\u7edf\u6027\u5730\u8003\u5bdf\u5927\u4f17\u5bf9\u65b0\u5174\u5f3a\u6743\u7684\u8868\u73b0\u548c\u77e5\u89c9\u4e5f\u5f88\u91cd\u8981\u3002\u66f4\u76f4\u63a5\u5730\u8bf4\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u53d1\u73b0\u63ed\u793a\u4e86\u4e2d\u56fd\u5b54\u5b50\u5b66\u9662\u6b63\u5728\u5e2e\u52a9\u4e2d\u56fd\u6539\u5584\u5916\u56fd\u6c11\u4f17\u5bf9\u5176\u7684\u770b\u6cd5\u3002<\/section>\n


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This article proposes and tests a mechanism of grassroots image management to explain how rising powers craft an international environment more conducive to their interests. The aim is to promote the state\u2019s foreign policy goals by influencing the perceptions of ordinary foreign citizens. To test this mechanism, we examine the impact of China\u2019s Confucius Institutes (CIs) as an observable instrument of China\u2019s grassroots image management strategy. Using data from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT), we employ a spatial\u2013temporal approach which finds that proximity to an active CI significantly and substantively improves the tone of media reporting about events relevant to China in that locality. The finding is robust to different specifications and estimation strategies, and is qualitatively consistent with results generated using household opinion data from Afrobarometer surveys. Theoretically, our results suggest the importance of systematically examining presentations and perceptions about rising powers at the popular level, in addition to focusing on elite attitudes, to understand discursive change. More directly, our findings reveal that CIs are helping to improve how China is viewed among foreign publics.<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/strong>\u5468\u96e8\u6a59<\/section>\n
\u3010\u5ba1\u6821\u3011<\/strong>\u8bb8\u6587\u5a77<\/section>\n<\/section>\n
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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Daniel Markovits\uff0c\u62c9\u6cd5\u8036\u7279\u5b66\u9662\u653f\u5e9c\u4e0e\u6cd5\u5f8b\u5b66\u9662\u6587\u5b66\u58eb\u5019\u9009\u4eba\uff1bAustin Strange\uff0c\u54c8\u4f5b\u5927\u5b66\u80af\u5c3c\u8fea\u653f\u5e9c\u5b66\u9662\u535a\u58eb\u5019\u9009\u4eba\uff1bDustin Tingley\uff0c\u54c8\u4f5b\u5927\u5b66\u80af\u5c3c\u8fea\u653f\u5e9c\u5b66\u9662\u6559\u6388\u3002<\/section>\n


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Foreign aid has served as an important policy tool for centuries, yet international relations research essentially treats it as a novel, post-World War II phenomenon. We argue that documenting aid-like activities in earlier historical periods helps shed new light on the systemic political dynamics of aid giving. We introduce a framework that links aid giving to the status quo in international politics and populate the framework with a diverse set of historical and contemporary cases, including Western and non-Western donors. Our analysis reveals striking similarities between the ways in which donor governments from diverse regions, historical periods, and international systems have utilised aid and other forms of concessional finance to pursue international political goals. Our findings suggest that by considering the pre-Marshall Plan roots of aid researchers can more effectively link foreign aid provision to rising power dynamics, international formal and informal hierarchies, and other research agendas in international relations. Our analysis also points to the need for greater attention to non-Western and pre-World War II evidence in understanding the link between aid and systems of international relations that have been less prevalent in the post-Marshall Plan era.<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011<\/strong>\u674e\u7389\u5a77<\/section>\n
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c01\u671f | Review of International Studies  Vol.45, No.4, 2019<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c02\u671f | International Relations Vol.33, No.3, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c03\u671f | International Organization Vol.73, No.3, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c04\u671f | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c05\u671f | European Journal of International Relations<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c06\u671f | Security Studies, Vol.28, No.4, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c07\u671f|International Security, Vol 44, No. 2, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c08\u671f| Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Vol.32,No.4<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c09\u671f| International Relations of Asia-Pacific Vol.19,No.3<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c10\u671f | International Studies Review, Volume.21, No.3, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c11\u671f|Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2019<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c12\u671f | International Affairs, Vol.95, No.6\uff0c2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u539f\u6587\u59cb\u53d1\u4e8e\u5fae\u4fe1\u516c\u4f17\u53f7\uff08\u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba\uff09\uff1a\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c13\u671f|Chinese Journal of International Politics, No.4, 2019<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u671f\u520a\u7b80\u4ecb \u300a\u4e2d\u56fd\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u6742\u5fd7\u300b\uff08The <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14687,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[36,34],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14686"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14686"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14686\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14701,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14686\/revisions\/14701"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14687"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14686"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14686"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14686"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}