{"id":14629,"date":"2019-11-17T13:52:07","date_gmt":"2019-11-17T05:52:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2019\/12\/31\/6f254ffe4e\/"},"modified":"2020-01-05T22:45:03","modified_gmt":"2020-01-05T14:45:03","slug":"6f254ffe4e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2019\/11\/17\/6f254ffe4e\/","title":{"rendered":"\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c09\u671f| International Relations of Asia-Pacific Vol.19,No.3"},"content":{"rendered":"
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International Relations of Asia-Pacific<\/em>\uff0c\u6210\u7acb\u4e8e2001\u5e74\uff0c\u7531\u725b\u6d25\u5927\u5b66\u51fa\u7248\u793e\u4ee3\u8868\u65e5\u672c\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u534f\u4f1a\u51fa\u7248\uff0c\u6bcf\u5e741\u6708\u30015\u6708\u548c9\u6708\u51fa\u7248\u5171\u4e09\u6b21\u3002\u8be5\u671f\u520a\u4e3b\u8981\u5173\u6ce8\u4e9a\u592a\u5730\u533a\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u52a8\u6001\uff0c\u5305\u62ec\u4e2d\u56fd\u56fd\u5185\u653f\u6cbb\u3001\u7f8e\u56fd\u5728\u4e9a\u592a\u5730\u533a\u7684\u5730\u4f4d\u3001\u5730\u533a\u6cbb\u7406\u3001\u65e5\u672c\u5bf9\u5916\u5173\u7cfb\u3001\u4e9a\u6d32\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7406\u8bba\u3001\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u5168\u7403\u5316\u9053\u8def\u4ee5\u53ca\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u56fd\u5bb6\u8ba4\u540c\u7b49\u3002\u6839\u636e2018 Journal Citation Reports\u663e\u793a\uff0c\u5176\u5f71\u54cd\u56e0\u5b50\u4e3a1.233\u3002 <\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n


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1. The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u6982\u5ff5\u53ca\u5176\u5728\u4e1c\u5357\u4e9a\u7684\u5e94\u7528\uff1a\u6279\u5224\u4e0e\u4e00\u9879\u65b0\u7684\u6982\u5ff5\u548c\u65b9\u6cd5\u6846\u67b6\u5021\u8bae<\/span><\/p>\n


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2. Shrinking Room for Hedging: System-unit Dynamics and Behavior of Smaller Powers<\/span><\/p>\n

\u5bf9\u51b2\u7a7a\u95f4\u7684\u7f29\u5c0f\uff1a\u7cfb\u7edf\u5355\u5143\u52a8\u6001\u4e0e\u5c0f\u56fd\u884c\u4e3a<\/span><\/p>\n


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3. Unambivalent alignment: Japan\u2019s China strategy, the US alliance, and the \u2018hedging\u2019 fallacy<\/span><\/p>\n

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4. Hedging in South Asia: balancing economic and security interests amid Sino-Indian competition<\/span><\/p>\n

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5. The variable effectiveness of hedging strategies<\/span><\/p>\n

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1.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u6982\u5ff5\u53ca\u5176\u5728\u4e1c\u5357\u4e9a\u7684\u5e94\u7528\uff1a\u6279\u5224\u4e0e\u4e00\u9879\u65b0\u7684\u6982\u5ff5\u548c\u65b9\u6cd5\u6846\u67b6\u5021\u8bae<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

J\u00fcrgen Haacke\uff08\u4f26\u6566\u653f\u6cbb\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5b66\u9662\uff09<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u5728\u540e\u51b7\u6218\u65f6\u671f\u590d\u6742\u7684\u5355\u6781\u683c\u5c40\u4e0b\uff0c\u4e2d\u56fd\u91cd\u65b0\u5d1b\u8d77\u4e3a\u7ecf\u6d4e\u4e0e\u519b\u4e8b\u5927\u56fd\uff0c\u4e00\u4e9b\u5c0f\u56fd\u4e0e\u4e2d\u7b49\u56fd\u5bb6\u6108\u53d1\u88ab\u8ba4\u4e3a\u6b63\u5728\u4f7f\u7528\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u3002\u8fd9\u79cd\u5206\u6790\u5728\u4e1c\u5357\u4e9a\u56fd\u5bb6\u4e2d\u5c24\u4e3a\u6d41\u884c\uff0c\u5b83\u4eec\u4e2d\u8bb8\u591a\u56fd\u5bb6\u9762\u4e34\u7740\u6765\u81ea\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u6311\u6218\u3002<\/span>\u7136\u800c\uff0c\u968f\u7740\u5bf9\u51b2\u7814\u7a76\u7684\u6269\u5c55\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e00\u6982\u5ff5\u672c\u8eab\u7684\u5206\u6790\u4ef7\u503c\u4f3c\u4e4e\u4e0d\u518d\u53d7\u5230\u91cd\u89c6\u3002\u5728\u73b0\u6709\u7814\u7a76\u4e2d\uff0c\u5173\u4e8e\u5bf9\u51b2\u7684\u4e0d\u540c\u7406\u89e3\u5f7c\u6b64\u7ade\u4e89\uff0c\u5b58\u5728\u8bb8\u591a\u6839\u636e\u7ecf\u9a8c\u786e\u5b9a\u7684\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u6807\u51c6\uff0c\u8fd9\u751a\u81f3\u5f15\u53d1\u4e86\u5728\u4e00\u4e2a\u57fa\u672c\u95ee\u9898\u4e0a\u7684\u6df7\u4e71\uff0c\u5373\u54ea\u4e2a\u56fd\u5bb6\u6b63\u5728\u4f7f\u7528\u7740\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u672c\u6587\u6539\u8fdb\u4e86\u5bf9\u51b2\u7684\u6982\u5ff5\u4e0e\u65b9\u6cd5\u6846\u67b6\uff0c\u5e76\u4ee5\u8fd9\u4e00\u6846\u67b6\u6e05\u695a\u5730\u8bf4\u660e\u5bf9\u51b2\u4e0e\u5176\u4ed6\u5b89\u5168\u6218\u7565\u7684\u533a\u522b\uff0c\u660e\u786e\u4e86\u8bc4\u4f30\u5c0f\u56fd\u5728\u9762\u4e34\u6765\u81ea\u5927\u56fd\u7684\u4e25\u91cd\u5b89\u5168\u6311\u6218\u65f6\u662f\u5426\u6b63\u5728\u4f7f\u7528\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u7684\u5173\u952e\u6807\u51c6\uff0c\u540c\u65f6\u4ee5\u9a6c\u6765\u897f\u4e9a\u4e0e\u65b0\u52a0\u5761\u4f5c\u4e3a\u8fd9\u4e00\u6846\u67b6\u7684\u5206\u6790\u5bf9\u8c61\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n


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In the context of the complex unipolar post-Cold War period that has witnessed China\u2019s reemergence as an economic and military power, small and middle powers are increasingly considered to be hedging. This analysis is especially prevalent in relation to Southeast Asian countries, many of which face security challenges posed by China. However, as the literature on hedging has expanded, the concept\u2019s analytical value is no longer obvious. Different understandings of hedging compete within the literature, and there are many criteria by which hedging is empirically ascertained, leading to confusion even over the basic question of which countries are hedging. In response, this article presents a modified conceptual and methodological framework that clearly delineates hedging from other security strategies and identifies key criteria to evaluate whether smaller powers are hedging when confronting a serious security challenge by one of the major powers. This framework is then applied to Malaysia and Singapore.<\/span><\/p>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u674e\u6e90<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011\u91d1\u78ca<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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2.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u5bf9\u51b2\u7a7a\u95f4\u7684\u7f29\u5c0f\uff1a\u7cfb\u7edf\u5355\u5143\u52a8\u6001\u4e0e\u5c0f\u56fd\u884c\u4e3a<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Shrinking Room for Hedging: System-unit Dynamics and Behavior of Smaller Powers<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong><\/p>\n

Alexander Korolev\uff08\u65b0\u5357\u5a01\u5c14\u58eb\u5927\u5b66\uff09<\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/strong>\u672c\u6587\u901a\u8fc7\u5bf9\u5c0f\u56fd\u5bf9\u51b2\u884c\u4e3a\u5c40\u9650\u6027\u7684\u5f3a\u8c03\u548c\u68c0\u9a8c\uff0c\u63d0\u51fa\u4e86\u5bf9\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u4e2d\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u7684\u7406\u89e3\u3002\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u662f\u533a\u57df\u6216\u56fd\u5bb6\u5c42\u9762\u800c\u975e\u7cfb\u7edf\u5c42\u9762\u53d8\u91cf\u7684\u7ed3\u679c\uff0c\u968f\u7740\u5927\u56fd\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\u548c\u5236\u8861\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u6fc0\u70c8\uff0c\u5c0f\u56fd\u53ef\u5229\u7528\u7684\u5bf9\u51b2\u7a7a\u95f4\u5728\u7f29\u5c0f\u3002\u672c\u6587\u4ee5\u51b7\u6218\u540e\u7684\u5357\u4e2d\u56fd\u6d77\u5730\u533a\uff0c\u7279\u522b\u662f\u83f2\u5f8b\u5bbe\u3001\u8d8a\u5357\u548c\u9a6c\u6765\u897f\u4e9a\u7684\u884c\u4e3a\u6f14\u53d8\u4f5c\u4e3a\u7814\u7a76\u5bf9\u8c61\uff0c\u5c55\u793a\u4e86\u5728\u4e2d\u7f8e\u7ade\u4e89\u65e5\u76ca\u6fc0\u70c8\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\u4e0b\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5730\u533a\u56fd\u5bb6\u5f00\u59cb\u4ece\u5bf9\u51b2\u8f6c\u5411\u5bf9\u5927\u56fd\u66f4\u4e3a\u660e\u663e\u7684\u8ffd\u968f\u800c\u4e0d\u987e\u5176\u56fd\u5185\u793e\u4f1a\u653f\u6cbb\u503e\u5411\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u5bf9\u51b2\u5177\u6709\u5c40\u9650\u6027\uff0c\u5e76\u4e14\u53ef\u4ee5\u8bbe\u60f3\u4e3a\u662f\u4e00\u79cd\u4e0e\u5927\u56fd\u6743\u529b\u5747\u8861\u5f3a\u5ea6\u6210\u53cd\u6bd4\u7684\u201c\u5962\u4f88\u54c1\u201d\u3002<\/p>\n


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This article advances the understanding of \u2018hedging\u2019 in international politics by highlighting and examining the limits to smaller powers\u2019 hedging behavior. Building on the line of reasoning that hedging is an outcome of regional or state-level, rather than system-level, variables, the article suggests that the room for hedging available to smaller states shrinks as great powers become more competitive and attempt to balance against one another. With an empirical focus on the post-Cold War South China Sea region, particularly the evolving behavior of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, the article demonstrates how, under the conditions of growing China\u2013US competition, these regional states start moving from hedging to more pronounced bandwagoning vis-\u00e0-vis great powers regardless their domestic-level sociopolitical dispositions. Therefore, hedging has limits and can be envisaged as a \u2018luxury\u2019 that is inversely related to the intensity of great power balancing.<\/p>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u91d1\u78ca<\/strong><\/p>\n

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3.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u4e0d\u77db\u76fe\u7684\u540c\u76df\uff1a\u65e5\u672c\u7684\u4e2d\u56fd\u6218\u7565\uff0c\u65e5\u7f8e\u540c\u76df\uff0c\u4e0e\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u6096\u8bba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Unambivalent alignment: Japan\u2019s China strategy, the US alliance, and the \u2018hedging\u2019 fallacy<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Adam Liff\uff08\u5370\u7b2c\u5b89\u7eb3\u5927\u5b66\u4f2f\u660e\u987f\u5206\u6821\uff09<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u672c\u6587\u8003\u5bdf\u4e86\u4e9a\u592a\u5730\u533a\u7684\u5730\u7f18\u653f\u6cbb\u5f62\u52bf\u7684\u53d8\u5316\u662f\u5426\u5bfc\u81f4\u65e5\u672c\u901a\u8fc7\u5b89\u5168\u4e0e\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8054\u7cfb\u591a\u6837\u5316\u6216\u8005\u91cd\u5927\u7684\u6218\u7565\u8c03\u6574\uff0c\u4ee5\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u4e0d\u65ad\u52a0\u6df1\u7684\u4e0d\u786e\u5b9a\u6027\u548c\u98ce\u9669\uff08\u6b63\u5982\u666e\u904d\u7684\u7814\u7a76\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u6587\u732e\u6240\u9884\u671f\u7684\u90a3\u6837\uff09\u3002\u672c\u6587\u68c0\u89c6\u4e862009\u5e74\u4ee5\u6765\u65e5\u672c\u7684\u4e09\u4e2a\u91cd\u8981\u9886\u57df\uff1a\u5b89\u5168\u653f\u7b56(\u4e3b\u8981)\u3001\u8d38\u6613\/\u6295\u8d44\u548c\u516c\u4f17\u8206\u8bba\u7684\u53d8\u5316\u8d8b\u52bf\uff0c\u6765\u786e\u5b9a\u65e5\u672c\u7684\u5bf9\u534e\u6218\u7565\u662f\u5426\u53d1\u751f\u6539\u53d8\u3002\u5c3d\u7ba1\u4e0d\u786e\u5b9a\u6027(\u548c\u52a8\u8361)\u4e0d\u65ad\u52a0\u6df1\uff08\u5c24\u5176\u662f\u5728\u201c\u7279\u6717\u666e\u65f6\u4ee3\u201d\uff09\uff0c\u8fd9\u9879\u7814\u7a76\u53d1\u73b0\u201c\u5bf9\u51b2\u201d\u884c\u4e3a\u7684\u8bc1\u636e\u51e0\u4e4e\u53ef\u4ee5\u5ffd\u7565\u4e0d\u8ba1\u3002\u4f8b\u5982\uff0c\u91cd\u65b0\u5b9a\u4f4d\u4e0e\u5317\u4eac\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u6216\u91c7\u53d6\u201c\u4e2d\u95f4\u7acb\u573a\u201d\uff0c\u66f4\u4e0d\u7528\u8bf4\u4e0e\u4e2d\u56fd\u53d1\u5c55\u4efb\u4f55\u6709\u610f\u4e49\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u5173\u7cfb\u4e86\u3002\u76f8\u53cd\uff0c\u73b0\u5728\u7684\u8d8b\u5411\u662f\u8d70\u5411\uff08\u4e0e\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\uff09\u76f8\u53cd\u7684\u65b9\u5411\uff1a\u65e5\u672c\u7684\u5bf9\u534e\u6218\u7565\u4e3b\u8981\u96c6\u4e2d\u5728\u52a0\u5f3a\u672c\u571f\u5a01\u6151\u80fd\u529b\u3001\u52a0\u5f3a\u7f8e\u65e5\u540c\u76df\u548c\u4f7f\u5730\u533a\u5185\u65e5\u672c\u7684\u5b89\u5168\u5173\u7cfb\u591a\u6837\u5316\u3002\u751a\u81f3\u540e\u8005\uff0c\u5728\u67d0\u79cd\u7a0b\u5ea6\u4e0a\u4e5f\u662f\u81ea\u76f8\u77db\u76fe\u7684\uff0c\u5176\u76ee\u6807\u662f\u6df1\u5316\u4e0e\u534e\u76db\u987f\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\uff0c\u5e76\u79ef\u6781\u53c2\u4e0e\u5730\u533a\u4e8b\u52a1\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n


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This article examines whether the Asia-Pacific region\u2019s geopolitical vicissitudes are causing Japan to \u2018hedge\u2019 against deepening uncertainty and risk through major strategic realignments or diversification of security and economic ties, as the original hedging literature would expect. It examines trends since 2009 in three domains fundamental to identifying whether shifts are underway in Japan\u2019s strategic orientation vis-\u00e0-vis China: security policy (primary), trade\/investment, and public opinion. Despite deepening uncertainty (and volatility), especially in \u2018the Trump era\u2019, this study finds negligible evidence of hedging behavior: e.g., realigning toward Beijing or adopting a \u2018middle position\u2019, much less developing any meaningful security ties with China. Rather, contemporary trends point in the opposite direction: Japan\u2019s China strategy primarily centers on strengthening indigenous deterrence capabilities, bolstering the US\u2013Japan alliance, and diversifying regional security ties beyond Beijing. Even the latter, somewhat paradoxically, aims to deepen ties with Washington and to keep it actively engaged in regional affairs.<\/span><\/p>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u5f90\u579a\u665f<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011\u8521\u5b87<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010\u5ba1\u6838\u3011\u9648\u821c\u6ce2<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u5357\u4e9a\u5bf9\u51b2\uff1a\u5728\u4e2d\u5370\u7ade\u4e89\u4e2d\u5e73\u8861\u7ecf\u6d4e\u548c\u5b89\u5168\u5229\u76ca<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/span><\/strong>Hedging in South Asia: balancing economic and security interests amid Sino-Indian competition<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Dr Darren Lim\uff08\u6fb3\u6d32\u56fd\u7acb\u5927\u5b66\uff09\uff1bRohan Mukherjee\uff08\u674e\u5149\u8000\u516c\u5171\u653f\u7b56\u5b66\u9662)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/span><\/strong>\u57fa\u4e8e\u7f8e\u4e2d\u5728\u4e1c\u4e9a\u548c\u4e1c\u5357\u4e9a\u5730\u533a\u7684\u7ade\u4e89\uff0c\u628a\u5bf9\u51b2\u4f5c\u4e3a\u4e00\u79cd\u6b21\u7b49\u56fd\u5bb6\u6218\u7565\u7684\u6587\u732e\u805a\u7126\u4e8e\u4e00\u4e2a\u5927\u56fd\u65e2\u5e26\u6765\u7ecf\u6d4e\u673a\u9047\u53c8\u5e26\u6765\u5b89\u5168\u5a01\u80c1\u7684\u72b6\u51b5\u3002\u76f8\u6bd4\u4e4b\u4e0b\uff0c\u9762\u4e34\u5370\u5ea6\u548c\u4e2d\u56fd\u7684\u6218\u7565\u7ade\u4e89\uff0c\u5357\u4e9a\u5730\u533a\u7684\u6b21\u7b49\u56fd\u5bb6\u5728\u6ca1\u6709\u5b89\u5168\u5a01\u80c1\u7684\u60c5\u51b5\u4e0b\u91c7\u53d6\u4e86\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u3002\u672c\u6587\u4ece\u7406\u8bba\u4e0a\u5bf9\u8fd9\u4e24\u79cd\u73b0\u8c61\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u8c03\u548c\u3002\u5bf9\u51b2\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u662f\u5728\u7ade\u4e89\u73af\u5883\u4e2d\u4e0e\u5927\u56fd\u5408\u4f5c\u65f6\uff0c\u5bf9\u7269\u8d28\u5229\u76ca\u548c\u81ea\u4e3b\u6210\u672c\u4e4b\u95f4\u7684\u5173\u7cfb\u8fdb\u884c\u6743\u8861\u3002\u5f53\u8fd9\u4e9b\u5229\u76ca\u548c\u6210\u672c\u540c\u65f6\u4e0a\u5347\u65f6\uff0c\u56fd\u5bb6\u5f88\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u91c7\u53d6\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u3002\u672c\u6587\u901a\u8fc7\u9a6c\u5c14\u4ee3\u592b\u548c\u65af\u91cc\u5170\u5361\u7684\u6848\u4f8b\u9a8c\u8bc1\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e00\u7406\u8bba\u7684\u5408\u7406\u6027\u3002\u65e0\u8bba\u5b89\u5168\u5a01\u80c1\u662f\u5426\u5b58\u5728\uff0c\u5bf9\u81ea\u4e3b\u6027\u7684\u6743\u8861\u90fd\u4e0d\u53ef\u6216\u7f3a\uff0c\u8fd9\u5728\u66f4\u5927\u7684\u7ecf\u9a8c\u8303\u56f4\u5185\u63a8\u52a8\u4e86\u7406\u8bba\u7684\u8fdb\u6b65\u3002<\/span><\/p>\n


<\/span><\/p>\n

The literature on hedging as a secondary state strategy \u2013 built largely on evidence from United States-China competition in East and Southeast Asia \u2013 focuses on conditions where a major power presents both an economic opportunity and a security threat. In South Asia, in contrast, secondary states facing strategic competition between India and China have pursued hedging strategies in the absence of a security threat. We develop a theoretical reconciliation of these two phenomena. Hedging at its core involves a trade-off between the material benefits and autonomy costs of cooperating with a major power in a competitive environment. States are likely to hedge when these benefits and costs are simultaneously rising. We test the plausibility of this theory in the cases of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The autonomy trade-off operates both in the absence and in the presence of a security threat, thus offering a theoretical advancement with greater empirical scope.<\/span><\/p>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u9648\u821c\u6ce2<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011\u674e\u6e90<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010\u5ba1\u6838\u3011\u8521\u5b87<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u8bba\u5bf9\u51b2\u6218\u7565\u6709\u6548\u6027\u7684\u53d8\u5316<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>The variable effectiveness of hedging strategies<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong><\/p>\n

John D. Ciorciari (\u7f8e\u56fd\u5bc6\u6b47\u6839\u5927\u5b66\u798f\u7279\u516c\u5171\u653f\u7b56\u5b66\u9662)<\/p>\n

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<\/p>\n

Governments often adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs. They hedge in the conventional, financial of the term by seeking to offset risks in global markets. They also adopt strategies to hedge against international security hazards by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating modest self-protection in case potential threats materialize. Both types of hedging typically are seen as prudent behavior. However, hedging strategies sometimes fail. Risks can be difficult to calculate, and the measures needed to hedge against them can be costly. Hedging international security risks can be particularly challenging, as governments sometimes lack access to adequate protective options at any price. This article illustrates the argument with two contrasting cases: relatively successful Southeast Asian hedging against the risk of financial calamity after the 1997 crisis and less effective efforts by some of the same states to hedge against the security risk of Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. <\/p>\n


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\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u8521\u5b87<\/strong><\/p>\n

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\u70b9\u51fb\u5de6\u4e0b\u89d2\u201c\u9605\u8bfb\u539f\u6587<\/span>\u201d\u53ef\u83b7\u53d6\u672c\u671f\u82f1\u6587\u7248\u539f\u6587<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n


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\u3010\u91cd\u78c5\u9884\u544a\u3011\u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba\u63a8\u51fa\u9876\u7ea7\u671f\u520a\u5b66\u672f\u52a8\u6001\u901f\u9012\uff01<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c01\u671f | Review of International Studies  Vol.45, No.4, 2019<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c02\u671f | International Relations Vol.33, No.3, 2019<\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c03\u671f | International Organization Vol.73, No.3, 2019<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c04\u671f | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c05\u671f | European Journal of International Relations<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c06\u671f | Security Studies, Vol.28, No.4, 2019<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c07\u671f|International Secur.ity, Vol 44, No. 2, 2019 | \u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c8\u671f| Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Vol.32,No.4<\/span><\/a>
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\"\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c09\u671f| <\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n
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\u539f\u6587\u59cb\u53d1\u4e8e\u5fae\u4fe1\u516c\u4f17\u53f7\uff08\u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba\uff09\uff1a\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c09\u671f| International Relations of Asia-Pacific Vol.19,No.3<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u671f\u520a\u7b80\u4ecb International R<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14630,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[36,34],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14629"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14629"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14629\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14646,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14629\/revisions\/14646"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14630"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14629"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14629"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14629"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}