{"id":14568,"date":"2019-10-20T14:02:50","date_gmt":"2019-10-20T06:02:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2019\/12\/31\/0c797eca24\/"},"modified":"2020-01-05T22:45:33","modified_gmt":"2020-01-05T14:45:33","slug":"0c797eca24","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/2019\/10\/20\/0c797eca24\/","title":{"rendered":"\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c05\u671f | European Journal of International Relations"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\u671f\u520a\u7b80\u4ecb<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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European Journal of International Relations<\/em>\uff08\u300a\u6b27\u6d32\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u6742\u5fd7\u300b\uff09\uff0c\u7b80\u79f0\u201cEJIR\u201d\uff0c\u662f\u7531\u6b27\u6d32\u653f\u6cbb\u7814\u7a76\u534f\u4f1a\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u5e38\u8bbe\u5c0f\u7ec4\uff08SGIR\uff09\u7ecf\u540c\u884c\u8bc4\u8bae\u7684\u5b63\u520a\uff0c\u6db5\u76d6\u7684\u8303\u56f4\u4ece\u524d\u6cbf\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u8fa9\u8bba\u5230\u5b66\u8005\u4eec\u611f\u5174\u8da3\u7684\u5f53\u4ee3\u548c\u5386\u53f2\u4e3b\u9898\u3002\u5b83\u6210\u7acb\u4e8e1995\u5e74\uff0c\u4e3b\u7f16\u4e3a\u8377\u5170\u963f\u59c6\u65af\u7279\u5927\u5b66\u7684Geoffrey Underhill\u3002\u6839\u636eJournal Citation Reports\u663e\u793a\uff0c2018\u5e74EJIR\u6742\u5fd7\u5f71\u54cd\u56e0\u5b50\u4e3a2.756\uff0c\u572891\u4e2a\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u7c7b\u671f\u520a\u4e2d\u6392\u540d\u7b2c11\uff0811\/91\uff09\u3002<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u7f16\u8bd1\uff1a<\/span><\/strong>\u5218\u745b\u741b\u3001\u91d1 \u7433\u3001\u674e\u4ee3\u9713\u3001\u6768\u827a\u534e\u3001\u66f9\u9e4f\u9e4f<\/span><\/p>\n

\u6821\u5bf9\uff1a<\/span><\/strong>\u5218\u745b\u741b\u3001\u91d1 \u7433\u3001\u674e\u4ee3\u9713\u3001\u6768\u827a\u534e\u3001\u66f9\u9e4f\u9e4f<\/span><\/p>\n

\u5ba1\u8bfb\uff1a<\/span><\/strong>\u91d1 \u7433<\/span><\/p>\n

\u6392\u7248\uff1a<\/span><\/strong>\u5434 \u4fe3<\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u672c\u671f\u76ee\u5f55<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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1. Toward a political economy of complex interdependence<\/p>\n

\u8d70\u5411\u590d\u5408\u76f8\u4e92\u4f9d\u8d56\u7684\u653f\u6cbb\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5b66<\/p>\n


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2. Towards an International Political Ergonomics<\/p>\n

\u8d70\u5411\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u5de5\u6548\u5b66<\/p>\n


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3. The financialization of mass wealth, banking crises and politics over the long run<\/p>\n

\u957f\u671f\u53d1\u5c55\u7684\u5927\u4f17\u8d22\u5bcc\u91d1\u878d\u5316\u3001\u94f6\u884c\u4e1a\u5371\u673a\u4e0e\u653f\u6cbb<\/p>\n


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4. Risky dis\/entanglements: Torture and sexual violence in conflict<\/p>\n

\u5371\u9669\u7684\u5206\u914d\u4e0e\u7ea0\u7f20:\u51b2\u7a81\u4e2d\u7684\u9177\u5211\u548c\u6027\u66b4\u529b<\/p>\n


<\/p>\n

5. Subverting economic empowerment: Towards a postcolonial-feminist framework on gender (in)securities in post-war settings<\/p>\n

\u98a0\u8986\u7ecf\u6d4e\u8d4b\u6743\uff1a\u57fa\u4e8e\u540e\u6b96\u6c11\u2014\u2014\u5973\u6027\u4e3b\u4e49\u6846\u67b6\u7684\u6027\u522b\u5b89\u5168\u7814\u7a76<\/p>\n


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6. The responsibility to protect in a world of already existing intervention<\/p>\n

\u5df2\u5b58\u5728\u5e72\u9884\u7684\u4e16\u754c\u4e2d\u7684\u201c\u4fdd\u62a4\u8d23\u4efb\u201d<\/p>\n


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7. Norm emergence as agenda diffusion: Failure and success in the regulation of cluster munitions<\/p>\n

\u4f5c\u4e3a\u8bae\u7a0b\u6269\u6563\u7684\u89c4\u8303\u8d77\u6e90\uff1a\u96c6\u675f\u5f39\u836f\u76f8\u5173\u89c4\u5219\u7684\u5f97\u4e0e\u5931<\/p>\n


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8. Making al-Qa\u2019ida legible: Counter-terrorism and the reproduction of terrorism<\/p>\n

\u4f7f\u57fa\u5730\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6e05\u6670\u53ef\u8fa8\uff1a\u53cd\u6050\u4e0e\u6050\u6016\u4e3b\u4e49\u201c\u91cd\u751f\u201d<\/p>\n


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9. Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations<\/p>\n

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10. Taking interaction seriously: Asymmetrical roles and the behavioral foundations of status<\/p>\n

\u6b63\u89c6\u4e92\u52a8\uff1a\u4e0d\u5bf9\u79f0\u6027\u89d2\u8272\u4e0e\u56fd\u9645\u5730\u4f4d\u7684\u884c\u4e3a\u57fa\u7840<\/p>\n


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11. Towards a political concept of reversibility in international relations: Bridging political philosophy and policy studies<\/p>\n

\u8bba\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u4e2d\u7684\u53ef\u9006\u6027\u653f\u6cbb\u89c2\uff1a\u653f\u6cbb\u54f2\u5b66\u4e0e\u653f\u7b56\u7814\u7a76\u7684\u5f25\u5408<\/p>\n


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12. How the normative resistance of anarchism shaped the state monopoly on violence<\/p>\n

\u56fd\u5bb6\u5177\u6709\u5bf9\u66b4\u529b\u7684\u5408\u6cd5\u5784\u65ad\u6743\u8fd9\u4e00\u89c4\u8303\u5982\u4f55\u56e0\u65e0\u653f\u5e9c\u4e3b\u4e49\u7684\u62b5\u6297\u800c\u53d1\u5c55?<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u6458\u8981\u8bd1\u6587<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n
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1.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u8d70\u5411\u590d\u5408\u76f8\u4e92\u4f9d\u8d56\u7684\u653f\u6cbb\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5b66<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Toward a political economy of complex interdependence<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Thomas Oatley<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6458\u8981\u3011<\/strong><\/span>\u200d<\/span>\u200d<\/span>\u5728\u590d\u5408\u76f8\u4e92\u4f9d\u8d56\u7684\u65f6\u4ee3\uff0c\u5b66\u8005\u4eec\u5e94\u8be5\u5982\u4f55\u5bf9\u56fd\u9645\u653f\u6cbb\u7ecf\u6d4e\u5b66\u8fdb\u884c\u7406\u8bba\u5316\uff1f\u76f8\u8f83\u4e8e40\u5e74\u524d\uff0c\u4eca\u5929\u7684\u5168\u7403\u7ecf\u6d4e\u76f8\u4e92\u4f9d\u8d56\u7a0b\u5ea6\u66f4\u9ad8\u3002\u56e0\u6b64\uff0c\u8d8a\u6765\u8d8a\u591a\u7684\u5b66\u8005\u8ba4\u4e3a\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u9700\u8981\u65b0\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u5de5\u5177\u6765\u89e3\u91ca\u590d\u5408\u76f8\u4e92\u4f9d\u8d56\u7684\u4ea7\u751f\u8fc7\u7a0b\u3001\u8fd0\u4f5c\u65b9\u5f0f\u4ee5\u53ca\u672a\u6765\u53d1\u5c55\u65b9\u5411\u3002\u4f5c\u8005\u8ba4\u4e3a\uff0c\u8981\u5f00\u53d1\u8fd9\u6837\u7684\u5de5\u5177\uff0c\u5fc5\u987b\u63a5\u53d7\u65b0\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u903b\u8f91\uff0c\u8fd9\u4e00\u65b0\u7684\u7406\u8bba\u903b\u8f91\u5e94\u8be5\u66f4\u80fd\u9002\u5e94\u548c\u89e3\u91ca\u53d8\u5316\u3002\u4f5c\u8005\u5229\u7528\u590d\u6742\u6027\u7406\u8bba\u3001\u751f\u6001\u5b66\u548c\u4fe1\u606f\u8bba\u5bf9\u5176\u89c2\u70b9\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u8bba\u8ff0\u3002\u9996\u5148\uff0c\u4f5c\u8005\u9610\u8ff0\u4e86\u57fa\u4e8e\u590d\u6742\u6027\u7684\u65b9\u6cd5\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u8981\u7d20\uff0c\u5e76\u5c06\u5176\u4e0e\u5f00\u653e\u7ecf\u6d4e\u653f\u6cbb\u5b66\u8def\u5f84\u7684\u6838\u5fc3\u5047\u8bbe\u8fdb\u884c\u4e86\u5bf9\u6bd4\u3002\u5176\u6b21\uff0c\u4f5c\u8005\u5229\u7528\u5171\u540c\u8fdb\u5316\u7684\u903b\u8f91\u548c\u5faa\u73af\u4fe1\u606f\u71b5\u89e3\u91ca\u4e862008\u5e74\u5168\u7403\u91d1\u878d\u5371\u673a\u53d1\u5c55\u8fc7\u7a0b\u4e2d\u7684\u5173\u952e\u56e0\u7d20\uff0c\u5e76\u501f\u6b64\u9610\u91ca\u4e86\u8fd9\u4e00\u4ee5\u590d\u6742\u6027\u4e3a\u5bfc\u5411\u7684\u8def\u5f84\u3002<\/span><\/section>\n

\u200d<\/span>\u200d<\/span><\/p>\n


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<\/span><\/p>\n

How should we theorize about international political economy in an era of complex interdependence? The global economy is much more interdependent today than it was 40 years ago. As a result, there is a widening appreciation that we need new theoretical tools to understand how complex interdependence arose, how it operates, and where it might be headed. I argue that to develop such tools, we must embrace new theoretical logics that more readily accommodate and explain change. I develop this point by drawing on complexity theories, ecology, and information theory. I first develop the core elements of a complexity-based approach and contrast it to the central assumptions of the Open Economy Politics approach. I then illustrate this complexityoriented approach by using the logic of coevolution and the information\u2013entropy cycle to explain key elements in the development of the 2008 global financial crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u91d1\u7433<\/p>\n

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2.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Towards an International Political Ergonomics<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Jonathan Luke Austin<\/p>\n

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<\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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This article introduces International Political Ergonomics. International Political Ergonomics is a novel research programme focused on achieving political change through the ergonomic (re)design of world politics. The approach is grounded on a shift across International Relations which recognizes that its epistemic (i.e. knowledge-producing) core is often inadequate to achieve change. Insights from the practice turn and behaviouralist International Relations, as well as from philosophy, sociology and neuroscience, demonstrate that much international behaviour is driven by the \u2018unconscious\u2019 or \u2018non-reflexive\u2019 re-articulation of repertoires of actions even where the pathologies of this process are known. This implies that knowledge production and dissemination (i.e. to policymakers, global publics) is often unable to effect influence over social practices. What is thus required is a non-epistemic means of producing world political change. International Political Ergonomics is a research programme that takes up this task. It does so by describing how small material interventions into world politics can radically shift individual behaviours by encouraging greater rationality, reflexivity and deliberation. After laying out the theoretical basis for this claim, the article demonstrates it by detailing the application of International Political Ergonomics to violence-prevention efforts. The article concludes by reflecting on the radical implications that International Political Ergonomics has for the vocation of International Relations.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u91d1\u7433<\/p>\n

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3.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong><\/span>The Financialization of Mass Wealth, Banking Crisis and Politics over the Long Turn<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong><\/span>Jeffrey M Chwieroth<\/p>\n

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The co-evolution of democratic politics and mass, financialized wealth has destabilized highly integrated financial systems and the socio-political underpinnings of neoliberal policy norms at domestic and global levels. Over the long run, it has increased the political pressure on governments to undertake bailouts during major banking crises and, by raising voters\u2019 attentiveness to wealth losses and distributional inequities, has sharply raised the bar for government performance. The result has been more costly bailouts, greater political instability and the sustained politicization of wealth cleavages in crisis aftermaths. We underline the crucial importance and modernity of this phenomenon by showing how the high concentration of wealth in pre-1914 Britain and America among elites was associated with limited crisis interventions and surprisingly tranquil political aftermaths. By contrast, the 2007\u20132009 crises in both countries epitomise the political dilemmas facing elected governments in a new world of mass financialized wealth and the impact on political polarization and democratic politics. We show that these dilemmas were embryonic in the interwar period and highlight how the evolutionary forces shaping policy and political outcomes reveal the importance of time, context and the effects of long cycles in the world economy and global politics.<\/p>\n

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4.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Risky dis\/entanglements: Torture and sexual violence in conflict<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Harriet Gray, Maria Stern<\/p>\n

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Conflict-related sexual violence has become increasingly recognized in international spaces as a serious, political form of violence. As part of this process, distinctions between the categories of \u2018sexual violence\u2019 and \u2018torture\u2019 have blurred as scholars and other actors have sought to capitalize on the globally recognized status of torture in raising the profile of sexual violence. This move, while perhaps strategically promising, even already fruitful, prompts us to heed caution. What might we inadvertently engender by further pursuing such positioning? While torture and sexual violence have both been widely framed within the academic literature as strategic in recent decades, only torture, and not sexual violence, has emerged from elements of this literature as (potentially) legitimate, despite the slippages between them as categories of violence. This article offers one avenue for thinking through what an invigorated focus on sexual torture as a category of violence might unwittingly render possible, and thus for reflecting on the possible stakes of collapsing the categories of sexual violence and torture. Ultimately, we argue that we should perhaps resist the urge to frame sexual violence as torture and instead cleave to the sticky signifier of \u2018the sexual\u2019, despite the ways in which it has served to normalize, perpetuate and obfuscate grievous harms throughout history.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u66f9\u9e4f\u9e4f<\/span><\/p>\n

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5.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Subverting economic empowerment: Towards a postcolonial-feminist framework on gender (in)securities in post-war settings <\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Maria Martin de Almagro,Caitlin Ryan<\/p>\n

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This article demonstrates that the inability of the United Nations Women, Peace and Security agenda to realize greater peace and security for women in post-war states stems to a great extent from its failure to engage deeply with the materiality of women\u2019s lives under economic empowerment projects. We argue that the Women, Peace and Security agenda reproduces a neoliberal understanding of economic empowerment that inadequately captures the reality of women\u2019s lives in post-war settings for two reasons: first, it views formal and informal economic activities as dichotomous and separate, rather than as intertwined and constitutive of each other; and, second, it conceptualizes agency as individual, disembodied, abstract, universalizing and conforming to the requirements of the competitive pressures of the market. The article then offers a three-pronged postcolonial-feminist framework to analyse international interventions in which representation, materiality and agency are interconnected. We argue that such a framework helps understand better who is empowered in post-war economies and how they are empowered. This, in turn, makes visible how post-war economies produce gendered and racialized (in)securities that need to be addressed by the Women, Peace and Security agenda. With this, we also hope to reflect on broader international political economy concerns about the problems of making conceptual distinctions between politics and economics, and to challenge the constructed borders between materiality and discourse that have pervaded peace and conflict studies.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u91d1\u7433<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>The responsibility to protect in a world of already existing intervention<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Robin Dunford ;Michael Neu <\/p>\n

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In the face of humanitarian crises, members of the international community are often presented with a choice: engage in forms of action, including military intervention, or stand by and watch. This framing ignores practices of intervention that are already taking place and contributing to the emergence and perpetuation of humanitarian crises. Despite calling for more attention to be paid to already existing intervention, literature on the Responsibility to Protect has not adequately understood its implications for the legitimacy and likely effectiveness of military intervention. To redress this gap, we argue, first, that a focus on already existing intervention complicates the moral calculus on which defences of military intervention as part of the Responsibility to Protect are based. Second, we claim that actors already engaged in damaging practices of intervention are bad international citizens who are not fit for the purpose of humanitarian military intervention. Third, we argue that in both ignoring already existing intervention and calling for additional military intervention under its third pillar, the Responsibility to Protect legitimises a moralistic form of militarism. These three arguments show that it is a mistake to follow recent literature in responding to already existing intervention by simply adding to the Responsibility to Protect, for instance, duties to engage in structural prevention and to support refugees. Rather, what is needed is a more fundamental rethink that departs from the Responsibility to Protect.<\/p>\n

Keywords:Good international citizenship, humanitarian intervention, jus ad bellum, mass atrocity, militarism, Responsibility to Protect<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u91d1\u7433<\/span><\/p>\n

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7.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Norm Emergence as Agenda Diffusion: Failure and Success in the Regulation of Cluster Munitions<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Elvira Rosert<\/p>\n

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The research on international norms offers several models of their evolution; however, a convincing model specifically depicting the phase of norm emergence is still lacking. Macro models (e.g. the norm life cycle) focus on the overall evolution of norms and distinguish the emergence phase as one among others, but they remain too rough. Meso models focus on a specific phase, but on phases other than norm emergence, such as diffusion (e.g. the signalling model) or enforcement (e.g. the spiral model). If they do focus on emergence, this focus remains case-specific and lacks theorisation. Micro models (e.g. the persuasion model or the funnelling model) focus on specific sequences within a phase. In this article, I develop one model of norm emergence by conceptualising it as the diffusion of a problem through different agendas and the discursive transformation of a problem into a (problem-solving) norm. The model distinguishes four sequences of norm emergence: problem adoption by norm entrepreneurs; issue creation in the public sphere; candidate norm creation in the institutional-deliberative sphere; and norm creation in multilateral negotiations. I illustrate the utility of this model by tracing the emergence of the norm against cluster munitions.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u5218\u745b\u741b<\/span><\/p>\n

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8.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Making al-Qa\u2019ida legible: Counter-terrorism and the reproduction of terrorism<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Sarah G. Phillips<\/p>\n

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Why did America\u2019s counter-terrorism strategy in Yemen fail to contain al-Qa\u2019ida in the Arabian Peninsula in the years prior to the Yemeni government\u2019s collapse in 2015? Moreover, why did the US administration think that its strategy was successful? This article draws from field research in Yemen and a diverse array of other Yemeni sources to argue that the answer lies in the fact that there are two broad, but ultimately irreconcilable, ontologies of what al-Qa\u2019ida in the Arabian Peninsula \u2018really is\u2019: one legible, organisationally rational and thus governable; and one not entirely so. I argue that by targeting tangible elements of al-Qa\u2019ida in the Arabian Peninsula (such as its leaders, sources of revenue and bases) in partnership with the Yemeni state security apparatus, the strategy strengthened the group\u2019s less coherent aspects. As a result, Western counter-terrorism practices target a stripped-down, synoptic version of the group while missing, even empowering, the shadowy appendage of state or hegemonic power that animates popular Yemeni discourses. This article is concerned with what al-Qa\u2019ida in the Arabian Peninsula looks like when we prioritise Yemeni observations about how it emerged and is reproduced. I argue that seeing al-Qa\u2019ida as at least partly illegible removes counter-terrorism\u2019s obvious targets, making it more suited to quelling anxieties than actually preventing terrorism.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u674e\u4ee3\u9713<\/span><\/p>\n

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9.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Allard Duursma, John Gledhill<\/p>\n

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Previous research has suggested that leaders of democratic regimes are particularly willing to contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations because backing \u2018liberal\u2019 peacekeeping allows them to support the diffusion of liberal institutions. However, evidence used to sustain this argument is based on contribution patterns during the decade of peacekeeping that followed the Cold War. In this article, we argue that there has been a reversal in the relative willingness of democratic and nondemocratic governments to provide the United Nations with peacekeepers since then. Specifically, we propose that the introduction of more \u2018robust\u2019 forms of peacekeeping during the 1990s has rendered democratic governments reluctant to contribute large numbers of peacekeepers to United Nations operations because elected leaders are now concerned that voters may object to the deployment of national troops to highrisk humanitarian missions in which there is no clear national interest. By contrast, non-democratic leaders partly discount public opinion because they are less reliant on popular support to retain power. Thus, when non-democrats see that contributing troops to United Nations peacekeeping will bring them reputational and\/or resource benefits, they are willing to contribute peacekeepers \u2014 and on a large scale. We test our claims quantitatively. We find that since the 1990s, democratic governments have remained more likely than non-democrats to contribute some troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations, but non-democratic governments have been more likely to make large-scale contributions. We also find that governments have been especially reluctant to make sizeable contributions to peacekeeping when elections have been on the horizon.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u674e\u4ee3\u9713<\/span><\/p>\n

\u3010\u6821\u5bf9\u3011\u6768\u827a\u534e<\/span><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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10.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Taking Interaction Seriously: Asymmetrical Roles and the Behavioral Foundations of Status<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Reinhard Wolf<\/p>\n

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Status has once again become a prominent topic in international relations. However, vague, incomplete, and incompatible definitions continue to stifle the development of a cohesive research program. Even the most sophisticated conceptualizations proposed fail to comprehend the full range of status conflicts and ambitions. Current research centers on collective beliefs about the traits that are valued in individual actors, so it especially fails to properly account for status differentiations that emerge through bilateral interactions and for defiant acts that upend local status hierarchies. It also neglects the most intense status infringements: acts and relationships that are humiliating. To remedy this conceptual weakness, this article will first review conceptual work in International Relations and beyond. It will then present an integrated model of two distinct status hierarchies \u2014 prestige and role status \u2014 and their causal linkages. In so doing, the article will attempt to clarify how \u201cstatus\u201d relates to similar concepts, such as \u201cauthority,\u201d \u201cprestige,\u201d \u201chonor,\u201d and \u201cglory.\u201d The explanatory value of this consolidated status framework will be demonstrated through a more nuanced and consistent discussion of Russia\u2019s seemingly erratic status disputes with \u201cthe West.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u5218\u745b\u741b<\/p>\n

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11.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u8bba\u56fd\u9645\u5173\u7cfb\u4e2d\u7684\u53ef\u9006\u6027\u653f\u6cbb\u89c2\uff1a\u653f\u6cbb\u54f2\u5b66\u4e0e\u653f\u7b56\u7814\u7a76\u7684\u5f25\u5408<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>Towards a Political Concept of Reversibility in International Relations: Bridging Political Philosophy and Policy Studies<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Hartmut Behr<\/p>\n

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While contingency and negation are relatively well-established notions in the theoretical analysis of international relations, their practical implications remain under-conceptualised. In order to discuss the question of how to act under conditions of contingency and negation, this article, in a first step, triangulates both with Aristotelian noesis. Such triangulation suggests that the consequences of political action cannot be predicted and always have inadvertent consequences due to the contingent and historically and intellectually negated and refutable (even self-refutable) character of politics. It therefore appears as irresponsible to enact policies with interminable consequences. Rather, responsible political action \u2014 which is responsible precisely as, and only if, it accounts for contingency and negation \u2014 must hence act only in such a way that its consequences are reversible. In a second step, policy theory is critically reviewed in light of reversibility and its underlying philosophical principles, trying to bridge political philosophy and policy studies for a mutually enriched analysis of politics. Such a bridging exercise not only brings enhanced normative reflection into policy studies, but also, in reverse, hints at the crucial aspect of the non-linear unfolding of action consequences, which is, in addition to questions for a future research agenda, discussed in the concluding section. These discussions are understood as a twofold, yet interlinked, contribution: first, to develop a concept of reversibility as a practical response to the philosophical notions of contingency and negation; and, second, to bridge two different paradigms, encouraging the synergy of scholarly expertise for the management of contemporary international and global problems.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u5218\u745b\u741b<\/span><\/p>\n

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12.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n<\/section>\n

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\u3010\u9898\u76ee\u3011<\/strong>How the normative resistance of anarchism shaped the state monopoly on violence<\/p>\n

\u3010\u4f5c\u8005\u3011<\/strong>Michael E. Newell<\/p>\n

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Rather than an assumption of statehood, the state\u2019s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is better understood as a normative ideal that regulates behavior, and constitutes states as the sole legitimate authority on violence. Existing literature on this norm has explored its development in response to piracy in the early to mid-1800s, but it has overlooked significant developments that occurred in response to the violence of transnational anarchist terrorism. Anarchist philosophers in the late 1800s resisted the normative basis of the state monopoly on violence and articulated their own competing claims. While their normative ideas failed to gain widespread acceptance, they elicited significant responses by states. In the Rome Conference of 1898 and the St. Petersburg Protocol, states reiterated the constitutive aspects of the state monopoly norm, and articulated new, deeper obligations to coordinate anti anarchist policies. State officials considered a protean form of collective security against the anarchists, and applied the state monopoly norm to the control of the violence of individual, rather than corporate, non-state actors for the first time. Similar to trends identified in existing literature on the state monopoly norm, this article notes that the response to the anarchists was bolstered by their perception as \u201coutsiders of authority,\u201d or violators of core constitutive norms of state authority. This trend and these broader historical dynamics are explained with reference to theoretical literature on normative resistance.<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7f16\u8bd1\u3011\u6768\u827a\u534e<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u3010\u91cd\u78c5\u9884\u544a\u3011\u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba\u63a8\u51fa\u9876\u7ea7\u671f\u520a\u5b66\u672f\u52a8\u6001\u901f\u9012\uff01<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c01\u671f | Review of International Studies  Vol.45, No.4, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c02\u671f | International Relations Vol.33, No.3, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c03\u671f | International Organization Vol.73, No.3, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c04\u671f | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019<\/span><\/a>
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\u539f\u6587\u59cb\u53d1\u4e8e\u5fae\u4fe1\u516c\u4f17\u53f7\uff08\u56fd\u653f\u5b66\u4eba\uff09\uff1a\u3010\u65b0\u520a\u901f\u9012\u3011\u7b2c05\u671f | European Journal of International Relations<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u671f\u520a\u7b80\u4ecb European Journa<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14569,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[36,34],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14568"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14568"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14568\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14582,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14568\/revisions\/14582"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14569"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14568"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14568"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/115.238.178.234:8090\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14568"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}