【新刊速递】第20期 | International Studies Quarterly, No.4, 2019

【题目】Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy

【作者】Adrian J. Shin，科罗拉多大学博尔德分校政治学系助理教授

【摘要】

本文认为，拥有丰富的自然资源导致发达民主国家对低技能移民的限制性政策。高价值自然资源的生产常常会排挤生产贸易商品的劳动密集型企业。当（贸易商品生产带来的）有利于移民的商业利益由于去工业化而消失时（即“荷兰病”），亲移民联盟在国内政治中的力量就会被削弱。由于没有强大的商业压力要求增加移民，于是政策制定者将移民拒之门外，以适应反移民者的利益。通过扩展有关24个富裕民主国家移民政策的最新数据集，作者发现，具有丰富石油资源的民主国家更有可能对低技能移民采取限制性的政策，尤其是这些国家在国际贸易中面临外国竞争的时候。本文的研究成果补充了以选民为基础的移民政策理论，为有关自然资源的政治经济学和国际移民的新兴研究做出了贡献。

This article argues that substantial natural resource wealth leads to more restrictive low-skill immigration policy in advanced democracies. High-value natural resource production often crowds out labor-intensive firms that produce tradable goods. When these proimmigration business interests disappear due to deindustrialization, also known as the Dutch Disease, the proimmigration coalition weakens in domestic politics. Without strong business pressure for increased immigration, policy-makers close their doors to immigrants to accommodate anti-immigrant interests. Using a newly expanded dataset on immigration policy across twenty-four wealthy democracies, I find that oil-richdemocracies are more likely to restrict low-skill immigration, especially when their economies are exposed to foreign competition in international trade. The results supplement the voter-based theories of immigration policy and contribute to an emerging literature on the political economy of natural resources and international migration.

【编译】贺凡熙

【校对】徐垚晟

【审核】金磊

【题目】Measuring Racial Bias in International Migration Flows

【作者】Andrew S. Rosenberg，俄亥俄州立大学政治学博士候选人

【摘要】

在跨国迁徙中是否存在种族偏见？尽管人们普遍认为种族主义和仇外心理会影响迁徙进程，但并没有系统的方法对此加以证明。因此，在本文中，作者构建了一种衡量方法——迁徙偏差（migration deviation）。迁徙偏差是指可观察到的国家间移民和基于非种族因素影响的模型（a racially blind model）预测的移徙流动之间的差异，该模型包含各种各样的政治和经济因素。通过衡量，作者进行了描述性统计分析，并提供证据表明，实际来自以黑人为主体国家的移民远少于根据非种族因素影响的模型作出的预测。这些结果为学者研究国际种族不平等开辟了新的道路。

Are international migration flows racially biased? Despite wide spread consensus that racism and xenophobia affect migration processes, no measure exists to provide systematic evidence on this score. In this research note, Iconstruct such a measure—the migration deviation. Migration deviations are the difference between the observed migration between states, and the flow that we would predict based on a racially blind model that includes a wide variety of political and economic factors. Using this measure, I conduct a descriptive analysis and provide evidence that migrants from majority black states migrate far less than we would expect under a racially blind model. These results pavea new way for scholars to study international racial inequality.

【编译】金琳

【校对】徐垚晟

【审核】金磊

【题目】The Diplomatic Presentation of the State in International Crises: Diplomatic Collaboration during the US-Iran Hostage Crisis

【作者】David E. Banks，美利坚大学国际服务学院教授

【摘要】

关于危机升级或减弱的理论通常关注的是冲突、压力和信息问题。然而，危机是否会升级有时可能取决于国内受众如何理解危机强度的减弱。在本文中，作者将Putnam的外交双层博弈模型与Erving Goffman的“互动秩序”和“面子”的概念相结合，创建出“外交展示”（Diplomatic Presentation）机制。作者论述了在各国认为外交成果符合共同利益，但存在被本国公众拒绝的风险的情况下，外交展示如何能够对达成这一成果起到帮助作用。成功的外交展示需要各国合谋，从而管理他们的行为表现，进行团队合作，并控制持异见者的影响。在评估这一机制时，作者分析了伊朗人质危机中的外交行为。在这场危机中，美国和伊朗的官员在一个戏剧性的“情景”中合谋串通并分别扮演了特定的角色，从而满足了美国和伊朗公众的情感需求。作者指出，展示这种情景的复杂性比其他重要理论更好地解释了危机的升级，而这一论点也有助于推动国际关系中有关象征性外交的研究，同时也挑战了危机具有对抗性这一普遍假设。

Theories of crisis (de-)escalation often focus on conflict, stress, and information problems. However, crisis (de-)escalation may sometimes hinge on how de-escalation is interpreted by domestic audiences. In this article, I combine Putnam’s two-level games model of diplomacy with Erving Goffman’s concepts of interaction order and face to create a mechanism I call “diplomatic presentation.” I show how diplomatic presentation can be instrumental for the crafting of diplomatic outcomes that states believe are in their mutualinterest but that run the risk of being rejected by their domestic publics. Successful diplomatic presentation requires that states collude together to manage their performance, engage in teamwork, and control the impact of unsympathetic audiences. In evaluating this mechanism, I analyze the diplomacy surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis. During this crisis, regime officials from the United States and Iran colluded in a the atrical “scenario,” in which both sides adopted specific roles in order to satisfy the sentiments of US and Iranian publics. I show that complications regarding the presentation of this scenario explain escalation of the crisis better than prominent alternatives. This argument contributes to the growing literature on symbolic diplomacy in international relations, while also challenging common assumptions about the adversarial nature of crises. 

【编译】刘潇昱

【校对】徐垚晟

【审核】金磊