【新刊速递】第19期 | Review of International Studies, No.1, 2020

【题目】Interests, ideas, and the study of state behaviour in neoclassical realism

【作者】Gustav Meibauer（伦敦政治经济学院博士后研究员，主要研究决策制定、军事干预和新古典现实主义对外交政策分析与国际关系理论的贡献）

【摘要】观念变量经常被运用在对国家行为的实证主义和物质主义分析之中。但是，当涉及到观念时，这些研究几乎不可避免地面临理论困境。本文作者提出，要将观念因素整合到对国家行为的实证主义和物质主义研究方法中，需要满足以下两个条件：（1）在概念上区分利益和观念、个人信念和社会观念；（2）解决操作性和可测量性的问题。为了实现这一目标，作者运用新古典现实主义进行案例研究。作者认为，在政治考量中，对观念重新进行概念化，作为个人信念的外在表现，可以使新古典现实主义者认识到观念和观念上的竞争如何干预从物质给定的利益到对外政策选择这么一条传送带。同时，它能更清楚地将语言和交流中可识别的思想操作化。作者建议，这种再概念化尽管与现实主义范式假定相一致，但不必被限制于新古典现实主义。实际上，它也可以被运用于不同的范式，同样会使具有实证主义思想的建构主义者和制度主义者避免在概念和方法上面临由不同的观念因素导致的困境。

Ideational variables have frequently been employed in positivist-minded and materialist analyses of state behaviour. Almost inevitably, because of these commitments, such studies run into theoretical challenges relating to the use of ideas. In this article, I suggest that integrating ideational factors in positivist and materialist approaches to state behaviour requires: (1) distinguishing conceptually between interests and ideation as well as between individual beliefs and social ideas; and (2) addressing challenges of operationalisation and measurability. To that end, I employ neoclassical realism as a case study. I argue that a re-conceptualisation of ideas as externalised individual beliefs employed in political deliberation allows neoclassical realists to focus on how ideas and ideational competition intervene in the transmission belt from materially given interests to foreign policy choice. At the same time, it more clearly operationalises ideas as identifiable in language and communication. I suggest this reconceptualisation, while consistent with realist paradigmatic assumptions, need not be limited to neoclassical realism. Instead, transposed to different paradigms, it would similarly allow positivist-minded constructivists and institutionalists to avoid a conceptually and methodologically awkward equation of different ideational factors.

【编译】李雯珲

【校对】丁伟航

【题目】The costs of war: Condolence payments and the politics of killing civilians

【作者】Thomas Gregory（奥克兰大学政治与国际关系讲师）

【摘要】联军向阿富汗和伊拉克平民提供了5000多万美元的慰问金。这些慰问金并不是用以承认错误，而是表达同情。而且慰问金项目本身也因武断、前后不一，以及对平民生命的估值过低而备受批评。本文将追溯支撑这一计划并影响其发展的战略必要性，而未过多关注与慰问金相关的实际问题和交战双方是否应该赔偿受害者的规范性争论。随着联军开始认识到平民伤亡的战略成本，他们使用各种策略来减轻平民伤亡对军事行动成功的影响。本文认为，支付慰问金不应被视为承认和回应平民痛苦的人道主义做派，而应视为一种武器系统，旨在确保达到具体的军事目标。因此，本文将探讨这一现象，即联军视慰问金为达到目的的手段，而非目的本身，这将继续物化和贬低阿富汗和伊拉克人的生命。

Coalition forces have spent upwards of $50 million on condolence payments to Afghan and Iraqi civilians. These condolence payments were intended as an expression of sympathy rather than an admission of fault, and the programme itself has been criticised for the arbitrary, inconsistent, and low valuation of civilian lives. Rather than focus on the practical problems associated with condolence payments or normative arguments about whether belligerents ought to compensate those harmed, this article will trace the strategic imperativesthat underpinned this programme and shaped its development. As coalition forces began to recognise the strategic costs of civilian casualties, they used a variety of tactics to mitigate the effects of civilian casualties on the success of military operations. This article will argue that condolence payments should not be seen as a humanitarian gesture designed to recognise and respond to the suffering of ordinary civilians, but will argue that condolence payments should be viewed as a weapons system aimed at securing specific military goals. As such, this article will argue that condolence payments continued to objectify and devalue the lives of Afghans and Iraqis by treating them as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves.

【编译】赵柳希

【校对】叶扶疏

【题目】‘#Refugees can be entrepreneurs too!’ Humanitarianism, race, and the marketing of Syrian refugees

【作者】Lewis Turner（德国弗莱堡大学）

【摘要】随着移民政策日益被重视，“难民创业者”在人道主义、媒体和学术界对难民的描述中变得越来越重要。约旦的扎塔里难民营被认为是难民“创业精神”的展示窗口，通过对该难民营的研究，本文认为将叙利亚难民群体认定为“创业者”是叙利亚人在种族殖民阶层中的定位，这一点在人道主义工作中处处体现着。对于约旦的许多人道主义工作者来说，叙利亚人的创业能力使他们有别于被动、穷困、依赖人道主义援助的非洲难民群体。在没有明确的种族对比的情况下，人道主义机构在网上把叙利亚难民宣传为“创业者”，让他们被认为更接近白人，从而更容易被西方受众和捐赠者接受，因为他们被想象成白人。本文扩展了学界对种族和人道主义之间关系的理解。此外，它还对“难民创业者”愿景的政治性影响提出了一些关键问题。“难民创业者”不需要政治支持和团结，他们需要获得的是资本主义自由市场的力量。

In the context of a greater focus on the politics of migration, the ‘refugee entrepreneur’ has become an increasingly important figure in humanitarian, media, and academic portrayals of refugees. Through a focus on Jordan’s Za‘tari refugee camp, which has been deemed a showcase for refugees’ ‘entrepreneurship’, this article argues that the designation of Syrian refugees as ‘entrepreneurs’ is a positioning of Syrians within colonial hierarchies of race that pervade humanitarian work. For many humanitarian workers in Jordan, Syrians’ ‘entrepreneurship’ distinguishes them from ‘African’ refugees, who are imagined as passive, impoverished, and dependent on humanitarian largesse. Without explicit racial comparisons, humanitarian agencies simultaneously market Syrian refugees online as ‘entrepreneurs’, to enable them to be perceived as closer to whiteness, and to thereby render them more acceptable to Western audiences and donors, who are imagined as white. This article extends scholarly understandings of the understudied relationship between race and humanitarianism. Furthermore, it asks critical questions about the political work and effects of vision of the ‘refugee entrepreneur’, which it locates within the context of the increasingly neoliberalised refugee regime. ‘Refugee entrepreneurs’ do not need political support and solidarity, but to be allowed to embrace the forces of free-market capitalism.

【编译】阮含含

【校对】叶扶疏

【题目】Traversing the soft/hard power binary: The case of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute

【作者】Linus Hagström（瑞典国防大学政治学教授，瑞典国际事务研究所高级研究员）；潘成鑫（迪肯大学国际关系副教授）

【摘要】在国际关系中，软实力和硬实力被概念化为经验上和规范上的两个分支，在实践上两者是相反的，一种是抽象的，有吸引力的且具有合法性，另一种是具体的，有强制力却缺乏合法性。本文批判了这种二元对立的概念化，并认为这种二元对立的概念和“自我”（self）与“他者”（other）的建构同时发生，并为其服务。文章进一步证明通常被定位为软、硬实力的实践是紧密联系在一起的。最好将软、硬实力分别理解为“表象力”（ representational force）和“物理力”（ physical force）。它们通过生产和纪律形式的权力运作相互交织，文章通过分析中日之间关于钓鱼岛/尖阁诸岛的争端来说明这一论点。两国政府在构建各自版本的事件以及自我、他者关系时都运用了表象力，软、硬实力二元对立本身扮演着一个角色，因为“自我”通常与软实力联系在一起，而“他者”则与硬实力联系在一起。再者，生产力的运行使前者的吸引力和后者的排斥性获得了优势，而纪律性权力在两个主体身上都强化了这些区别。最终双方通过进一步加强自我、他者的区分，使各自即将采取针对对方的暴力行为合法化，从而呈现实践中软、硬实力是如何无法分离的。

Soft power and hard power are conceptualised in International Relations as empirically and normatively dichotomous, and practically opposite – one intangible, attractive, and legitimate, the other tangible, coercive, and less legitimate. This article critiques this binary conceptualisation, arguing that it is discursively constructed with and for the construction of Self and Other. It further demonstrates that practices commonly labelled and understood as soft power and hard power are closely interconnected. Best understood as ‘representational force’ and ‘physical force’ respectively, soft and hard power intertwine through the operation of productive and disciplinary forms of power. We illustrate this argument by analysing the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Both governments exercise representational force in constructing their respective versions of events and Self/Other. The soft/hard power binary itself plays a performative role as the Self is typically associated with soft power and the Other with hard power. The operation of productive power, moreover, privileges the attractiveness of the former and the repellence of the latter, and disciplinary power physically enforces these distinctions on subjects in both states. Finally, reinforced Self/Other distinctions legitimise preparations for violence against the Other on both sides, thus exposing how fundamentally entangled soft and hard power are in practice.

【编译】杨帆

【校对】晋玉