【新刊速递】第04期 | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019

【题目】Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela

【作者】Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi

【摘要】现代侍从交易通常通过中间人进行，如政党活动家、企业雇主、地方势力、传统领袖等。政客们利用这些掮客来动员选民，但我们对其相对效果知之甚少。作者认为，掮客的有效性取决于他们对选民的影响力和监控能力。政党活动家和企业雇主是最常见的两类掮客，作者运用该理论来对比这两类掮客，发现后者在影响力和监控力上都享有许多优势。作者在委内瑞拉和俄罗斯进行了实地调查实验，发现选民对来自雇主的投票要求反应更为强烈。文章解释，这是因为选民担心失业和雇主对其工作场所社交网络的嵌入。这一研究结果揭示了最有利于侍从主义的条件，并强调掮客类型有助于理解侍从主义在某些国家盛行的原因。

Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.

【编译】朱文菡

【校对】李雯珲

【题目】Voting for Victories：Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections

【作者】Sarah Zukerman Daly

【摘要】为什么选民会投票给对平民使用暴力的政治人物？尽管采取暴行，参与战争的政党还是能够赢得战后民主选举。本文运用了1970-2010年全球战后选举的新的跨国数据，以及萨尔瓦多战后选举中的投票、调查、档案和采访数据。研究发现：交战方在战后选举中的胜利是由于冲突末期军事力量的分布，而不是战争中的暴力运用水平以及选举中的威胁作用。军事力量占优的交战方能够做出和平承诺，即被理解为有能力提供安全，从而拥有良好的声誉。这使其拥有“安全筹码”，更能吸引中间选民。军事力量占优的交战方提供安全的行为抵消并美化了过去的暴行，使他们的选举合理化。本文帮助人们认识暴力事件后的政治生活，这有助于理解为安全而进行的选举，也有助于理解人们看似违背直觉的投票行为。

Why do citizens elect political actors who have perpetrated violence against the civilian population? Despite their use of atrocities, political parties with deep roots in the belligerent organizations of the past win postwar democratic elections in countries around the world. This article uses new, cross-national data on postwar elections globally between 1970 and 2010, as well as voting, survey, archival, and interview data from El Salvador. It finds that belligerents’ varied electoral success after wars can be explained not by their wartime levels of violence or use of electoral coercion, but by the distribution of military power at the end of conflict. It argues that militarily stronger belligerents are able to claim credit for peace, which translates into a reputation for competence on the provision of security. This enables them to own the security valence issue, which tends to crosscut cleavages, and to appeal to swing voters. The stronger belligerents’ provision of security serves to offset and justify their use of atrocities, rendering their election rational. This article sheds light on political life after episodes of violence. It also contributes to understanding security voting and offers insights into why people vote in seemingly counterintuitive ways.

【编译】邢戎

【校对】李雯珲